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 Abstract 
Continuity of operations planning for Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
(HBCUs) is critical for institution sustainability. The absence of such planning can result 
in an HBCU closing for an extended period of time after a disaster resulting in loss of 
revenue, research projects, students, faculty, and staff. There is a void of information on 
the extent of continuity of operations planning at HBCUs and how these institutions 
would continue functioning after a disaster. Using resilience theory as the foundation, the 
purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the extent of continuity of operations 
planning at HBCUs in Alabama in the event of a disaster and explore opportunities to 
strengthen continuity planning for the future. Four HBCUs were chosen in the State of 
Alabama for this research. Data were collected through interviews with 5 individuals 
with information on continuity of operations planning at the universities selected. These 
data were inductively coded and subjected to thematic analysis. The results of this study 
indicate comprehensive continuity of operations planning is not taking place, and 
planners at these institutions perceive they do not have the guidance needed for effective 
planning and the time to conduct planning activities. It is recommended the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) develop a guideline for continuity of 
operations planning applicable to higher education. It is further recommended that HBCU 
leadership insure planners have adequate time and resources to devote to continuity of 
operations planning. This study fosters positive social change by bringing an awareness 
to FEMA and HBCU leadership of the need and importance of continuity of operations 
planning for institutional sustainability.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
This study explored the extent of continuity of operations planning at HBCUs in 
the State of Alabama to determine how well prepared they are to continue mission-
essential functions during and after a disaster or critical incident. Mission-essential 
functions in general are characterized as functions and operations that must take place in 
order to sustain the viability of an organization (Federal Emergency Management Agency 
[FEMA], 2013). For institutions of higher education, mission-essential functions include 
instruction, research, information technology, care of laboratory animals and research 
specimens, major sporting events, housing, food service, and ancillary functions such as 
payroll, financial aid disbursements, security, and library services (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2013). These general mission essential functions affect most if not all 
institutions of higher education. Major universities that have medical schools, law 
schools, and industrial activities on their campuses have additional mission-essential 
functions to consider (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). 
In addition to mission-essential functions, the concept of continuity of operations 
planning as it relates to institutions of higher education involves succession, delegation, 
alternative facilities, communications, vital records, devolution, and reconstitution of 
operations (FEMA, 2013). These are critical components of overall continuity of 
operations planning. 
Succession is the process of designating individuals to take the place of those who 
are in the university leadership hierarchy should they become unavailable or 
incapacitated (FEMA, 2013). Delegation is the granting of authority to individuals to 
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make decisions in satellite locations or in the field during a critical incident (FEMA, 
2013). This includes campus law enforcement, physical plant personnel, and other 
individuals who might be considered first responders (FEMA, 2013). Alternative 
facilities, also referred to as continuity facilities, are locations, platforms, and venues that 
can be utilized to resume or continue operations (FEMA, 2013). For IHEs, this might 
involve delivering instruction completely online or at temporary locations such as 
churches, nearby schools, and community centers. Continuity of communications 
involves the ability to maintain information technology functions, telecommunications, 
and emergency notifications when there has been a disruption in power or other 
infrastructure disruption (FEMA, 2013). Satellite telephones and the availability of 
generators to keep information technology systems operating in a crisis situation are 
viable strategies in this regard. Vital records management considers the identification, 
storage, protection, and availability of records that are critical for operations; it may 
entail cloud-based storage and the storage of hard copies off-site (FEMA, 2013). FEMA 
(2013) identifies devolution is the process of transferring an operation, along with all 
authority and responsibility for that operation, to another entity. An example of 
devolution in the IHE realm was the transfer of Tulane University’s medical school to the 
Texas Medical Center in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Crawford, Kahn, Gibson, 
Daniel, & Krane, 2008). Reconstitution is the process by which an IHE resumes normal 
operations or the new normal at its alternative or former location of operation (FEMA, 
2013). 
There is relatively limited literature on COOP in higher education. Most of the 
existing literature details the planning, preparation, and response phases of emergency 
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management at IHEs. No studies have been found that specifically address COOP at 
HBCUs. At most, the literature has been anecdotal, such as descriptions of the plight of 
HBCUs in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (Gasman & Drezner, 2007). 
The potential social and economic value of my study is substantial. Tuition, 
research funding, and other grants are major streams of income for HBCUs (Gasman & 
Drezner, 2013; Toldson & Cooper, 2014). Canceling classes, closing for the remainder of 
a semester, or being unable to open for a semester (as was the case for some IHEs 
following Hurricane Katrina) can negatively impact these major streams of income 
(Johnson, 2011). The result can be the loss of students and faculty to other institutions, 
which would threaten the future of the affected HBCUs (Owen, 2010). Exploring the 
preparedness of Alabama’s HBCUs to continue functioning during and after a disaster 
will identify strengths and weaknesses in COOP and will have broad application for other 
HBCUs throughout the United States. 
In this chapter, the important societal role of IHEs and HBCUs in particular are 
discussed to show the need to keep these institutions viable through appropriate 
continuity planning. The current literature on best practices and government guidelines 
for overall emergency management planning at IHEs leave a gap with regard to specific 
COOP guidance for these institutions. Unfortunately, the preponderance of the literature 
is focused on preparedness and response, with only a very brief reference in some cases 
to COOP. 
Background of the Study 
IHEs are an important segment of our nation’s education system and are often 
viewed as the gateway for “intellectual maturity and personal growth” (Davis, 2013, p. 
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113). According to Davis (2013), government records indicate that obtaining a college 
degree will significantly increase ones earning potential. Hawkins (2007) posits IHEs are 
considered national treasures in the United States due to their important role in 
developing and shaping the intellectual, personal growth, and financial potential of 
students.  
Within the broader category of IHEs, HBCUs specifically have played a crucial 
role in the education of the African American community. Brown (2013) described 
HBCUs as remarkable in terms of the education opportunities they provide to African 
Americans. These institutions were identified by the Higher Education Act of 1965, 
which defined them as any IHE that was founded prior to 1964 for the express purpose of 
educating African Americans and that maintains accreditation by a regional accreditation 
authority (Brown, 2013). 
HBCUs have a legacy of educating African Americans who would not normally 
qualify for admission or perform well at a predominantly white institution (Stewart, 
Wright, Perry, & Rankin, 2008). HBCUs have been hugely successful in fulfilling their 
mission, graduating over 75% of all African American Ph.D.’s, 75% of African American 
Army officers, 80% of African American federal judges, and 85% of African American 
physicians (Nichols, 2004). Other studies have revealed that HBCUs graduate over 48% 
of all African American teachers and computer scientists, and six HBCUs combine to 
graduate over 40% of all African American engineers (a2004). 
In spite of the HBCUs’ legacy of success, these universities have been plagued in 
recent years by negative publicity, low graduation rates, allegations of mismanagement, 
fiscal instability, miniscule endowments, and even closures (Association for the Study of 
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Higher Education, 2010; Drezner & Gupta, 2012; Gasman & Bowman, 2011; Hobson, 
2012). Many of the important bastions of academia that serve the African American 
community are experiencing an uncertain future.  
Especially due to their tenuous existence, most HBCUs can ill afford to suffer a 
debilitating blow from a catastrophic disaster exacerbated by a lack of preparedness. A 
major disruption in the education process or a temporary closure would leave a serious 
void in the African American community in that HBCUs “educate students in an 
environment free of racial tensions” (Nichols, 2004). Being able to continue the 
education process in the face of disasters will ensure that HBCUs can remain a prominent 
higher education resource for the African American community. 
Problem Statement 
Incidents of active shooter occurrences at IHEs are on the rise (Blair & 
Martindale, 2013) and have garnered national media attention. Severe weather-related 
incidents have negatively impacted operations at IHEs in the Gulf Coast region (Beggan, 
2011; Stein, Vickio, Fogo, & Abraham, 2007). Pandemics including the H1N1 flu virus 
in 2009 (Katz, May, Sanza, Johnson, & Petinaux, 2012) have ushered in quarantines at 
IHEs. All these events have raised awareness of the need for comprehensive emergency 
management planning at IHEs. In response, federal government agencies have published 
several guides within recent years. The Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency 
Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher Education is a detailed roadmap published by 
the U.S. Department of Education (2013) in cooperation with the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) for the purpose of assisting IHEs in the development and 
testing of emergency operations plans. This guidance builds on the earlier template, 
6 
 
Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2010). The U.S. Secret Service (2010), in cooperation with the 
Department of Education and Federal Bureau of Investigations, published Campus 
Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education, which described 
the extent of violent acts occurring on campuses and mitigation strategies that can be 
employed. Private trade groups such as the National Fire Prevention Association (2010), 
ASIS International (2005), and the National Association of College and University 
Business Officers (2009) have also published guidelines to assist in the development of 
emergency operations plans by IHEs. 
As discussed above, there is substantial literature delineating best practices in 
preparing for and responding to disasters that impact IHEs. However, there is no 
comprehensive government guidance on continuity of operations planning specifically 
for IHEs. The overarching guideline issued by the federal government, Continuity 
Guidance Circular 1 (FEMA, 2013), on continuity of operations planning for 
nongovernmental entities does not give particular guidance to the education industry in 
general on how to plan for the continuation of operations during and after a disaster. 
Rather, this guidance is focused on continuity of operations planning for nonfederal 
government agencies, with only a mention that “private sector and other non-government 
organizations may also benefit from this guidance” (FEMA, 2013, p. 1-1).  
The nongovernment discussions of continuity of operations planning at IHEs have 
extolled online learning as the mainstay of instruction delivery (Lorenzo, 2008). This 
option came into prominence during Hurricane Katrina when the Sloan Consortium 
provided instructional support for 153 institutions of higher education throughout the 
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Gulf Coast area (Lorenzo, 2008; SchWeber, 2008). Online classes were developed to 
allow students at affected institutions to complete the fall 2005 semester. Based on the 
success of this program, online learning quickly became established as a best practice for 
continuing the education process during a disaster (American College Health 
Association, 2011; Coyner, 2011; Ebersole, 2008; SchWeber, 2007; Young, 2009). 
However, instructional delivery is not the only consideration in higher education. 
There is also a distinct absence of literature on continuity plans for the following facilities 
and operations that are of important concern at many IHEs: 
 Residential facilities 
 Major sporting events 
 Hospitals and auxiliary facilities (clinics, laboratories, dialysis) 
 Research facilities 
 Laboratory animals and specimens 
 Libraries 
 Museums and archives 
 Zoos, aquariums, and historical attractions 
 K-12 laboratory schools 
 Internships 
 Retail business strategic alliances 
 Businesses operating in leased space 
This major gap in the literature addressing COOP and IHEs, coupled with the 
tenuous status of many HBCUs, places these institutions in a precarious position of 
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significant vulnerability to a disruption, which could result in a temporary or even 
permanent closure of an institution. The HBCUs scattered across Alabama represent a 
diverse grouping of institutions, situated in a geographical area with incumbent hazards:  
 Hurricanes (along the coastal areas).  
 Winter storms.  
 Earthquakes (the San Madrid fault).  
 Tornadoes (in northern Alabama).  
 Flash floods.  
 Forest fires.  
 Terrorist attacks (primarily a threat in larger cities and near military 
bases). 
  Radioactive matter discharge (due to some schools’ proximity to nuclear 
plants).  
 Major criminal incidents. 
Moreover, the findings of this study on HBCUs in Alabama will have broad application 
to other HBCUs throughout the nation.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the extent of COOP at 
HBCUs in the state of Alabama. The central phenomenon under study is COOP, or the 
preparation and planning for continuing the education process and all essential functions 
during and after a critical incident.  
 
9 
 
Research Questions 
Creswell (2007) recommends asking no more than one or two central questions 
that can be further elucidated by no more than seven sub-questions. For this study, the 
following two research questions were posed: 
RQ1 What is the extent of continuity of operations planning at HBCUs in the State of 
Alabama? 
RQ2 What can be done to strengthen COOP at these institutions? 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical lens through which my study was conducted was the resiliency 
theory. Resiliency in general is the ability to bounce back or rebound as opposed to 
breaking under stress or duress (Norris, Stephens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 
2008; Plough et al., 2013). Resiliency theory, founded in the behavioral sciences, sought 
to understand how some individuals were successfully able to surmount obstacles and 
adversity while others were not (Plough et al., 2013). Adaptive capacity (Plough et al, 
2013) and positive adaptation (Kim & Hargrove, 2013) are the terms that have evolved 
over time to conceptualize the phenomenon of resiliency. Most notably, resiliency theory 
has been applied in the education system to determine how some individuals from 
disadvantaged and marginalized groups have been able to succeed in their educational 
pursuits by making adjustments and through the reduction of risk when the odds have not 
been in their favor (Kim & Hargrove, 2013). 
In the larger context of community resilience, resilience can be viewed as the 
adaptive capacity of a system to “absorb, change, and still carry on” (Longstaff et al., 
2010, p. 3). Community resiliency has been defined as “the sustained ability of a 
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community to withstand and recover from adversity” (Plough et al., 2013). Communities, 
viewed as “complex systems” (Longstaff et al., 2010, p.1) that are sufficiently resilient 
will be able to absorb a disruptive event, or change or adjust in response to such an event, 
and carry on. To elucidate this point further, Longstaff (2010) states a resilient 
community can make the necessary adjustments to confront a critical incident and ensure 
that essential functions and structures are retained for long-term sustainability. Short-term 
disruptions in service and operations may still occur, or certain subsystems may become 
temporarily unstable, but a resilient community will be able to adequately address these 
short-term disruptions and expeditiously return to a state of normalcy or a new norm for 
long-term survivability. A case in point is the adaptive capacity demonstrated by Tulane 
University and Dillard University in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Both institutions 
had short-term disruptions in their education process. However, they were able to bounce 
back rather quickly for long-term survival. Tulane University acquired a cruise ship for 
housing and classroom purposes (Johnson, 2011). Dillard University was able to transfer 
its housing and classroom instruction to the Hilton Hotel in New Orleans (Johnson, 
2011). Johnson (2011) states there were no prior agreements with the cruise ship or the 
hotel to use these facilities in the event of a critical incident. 
Resilience is not an outcome, but a process that embodies a set of adaptive 
capacities. The literature is not consistent on the identity of these capacities. Norris et al. 
(2008) cited economic development, social capital, information and communication, and 
community competence as components. Plough et al. (2013) cited physical and 
psychological health, social and economic equity and well-being, effective risk 
communication, integration of organizations, and social connectedness. All these 
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adaptive capacities are applicable in some form to the continuity of operations in higher 
education. 
In order for an institution of higher education to be resilient, it must be able to 
bounce back from a disruption and continue its mission-essential functions (Longstaff et 
al., 2010). It must be connected with community and government agencies, through 
social connectedness, to be able to access their resources when needed (Norris et al., 
2008; Plough et al., 2013). Long-term survivability is the goal, with the understanding 
that minor disruptions in the academic process may occur and may need to be absorbed 
by other internal departments or functions. Moreover, IHEs that are highly robust due to 
the resources at their disposal and that develop a high level of adaptive capacity will have 
strong resiliency in the face of a catastrophic or an otherwise disruptive event (Longstaff 
et al., 2010). The opposite is true of IHEs that have scarce resources and lack adaptive 
capacity (Drezner  & Gupta, 2012). According to Drezner and Gupta (2012), few IHEs, 
with the exception of larger, complex schools with sizable endowments, have adequate 
resources and proficient adaptive capacity. 
HBCUs do not generally have robust financial resources to draw upon in 
comparison to PWIs, based on their funding shortfalls and small endowments (Drezner & 
Gupta, 2012). Hence, HBCUs must have a high degree of adaptive capacity in order to 
bounce back from a disruptive incident. For instance, if an HBCU lacks sophisticated 
communication equipment such as satellite telephones, it will need instead to be adaptive 
and use telephone trees, the Internet, social media, or its own emergency notification 
system. 
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Resiliency theory is directly related to the research questions and the approach of 
this study. As noted, the two research questions involve exploring the extent of continuity 
planning at HBCUs in Alabama and how planning can be strengthened. Appropriate 
planning through the development of resources and adaptive capacity will build 
resiliency to counter disruptive events that may negatively affect furtherance of these 
institutions’ mission-essential functions. Such factors as economic health, social 
connectedness, communication, and physical and psychological health are all keys to 
building resiliency for maintaining continuity (Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & 
Pfefferbaum, 2008). Additional discussion on resiliency theory and its applicability to 
continuity will be provided in Chapters 2 and 5.  
Nature of the Study 
In this qualitative study, utilizing a purposeful sample, it was my intent to 
determine the extent of continuity planning at HBCUs in Alabama and ways in which 
continuity planning can be strengthened to improve the sustainability and viability of 
these institutions. It was decided that three to five Alabama HBCUs representative of 
similar institutions throughout the nation would be participants in the study. HBCUs in 
Alabama are diverse in their size, geographical location, exposure to hazards, and 
classification. Alabama has the highest number of HBCUs in the nation (Brown, 2013). 
HBCUs in the state are located in coastal areas, major metropolitan areas, in close 
proximity to nuclear plants and military installations, and in areas that are susceptible to 
such natural hazards as tornadoes, hurricanes, winter storms, forest fires, flash floods, and 
earthquakes. Hence, a study of the extent of continuity planning at these institutions will 
have broad applicability to the other 105 HBCUs scattered throughout the United States. 
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I collected data through administration of a survey instrument, interviews with the 
person responsible for emergency operations planning at each university, examination of 
emergency operations plans, review of exercise after-action reports, and documentation 
of responses to actual emergency response scenarios. Coding took place to develop 
general themes and to ascertain the extent of continuity planning. 
The literature review conducted for this study was focused on continuity planning 
guidance for IHEs in general, with special attention to COOP at HBCUs.  
Operational Definitions 
Academic continuity: In the present study, this term is used synonymously with 
COOP in the IHE context and refers to the process of continuing the performance of 
mission-essential functions during and after a critical incident at IHEs (University of 
Maryland, 2007). The term tends to focus more on the delivery of instruction than on the 
continuation of research, sustenance, housing, payroll, and other functions that would 
also be categorized as mission-essential. The term draws upon the basic concepts of 
COOP with application to a higher education setting. 
Continuity: This term is synonymous with continuity of operations planning, and 
the two are used interchangeably in the emergency management field (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2013). 
Continuity of operations planning (COOP). This term was coined by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2013). It refers to the process of foreseeing 
how an entity will continue the performance of mission-essential functions during and 
after a critical incident. 
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA is an agency of the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security that is primarily charged with coordinating 
responses to disasters in the United States that have overwhelmed the resources of state 
and local authorities (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). These 105 institutions 
were so defined under the Civil Rights Act of 1965, which specifically designated 
regionally accredited institutions of higher education that existed prior to 1964 and served 
a predominantly African American population (Brown, 2013). 
Institution of Higher Education (IHE). An educational institution that offers 
academic instruction beyond the secondary educational level (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2013). 
Predominantly White Institutions (PWIs). Institutions serving a population that 
is predominantly Caucasian (Drezner & Gupta, 2012). 
Purposeful Sampling. A sampling strategy where the researcher purposefully 
selects study participants based upon the data rich information they can provide to 
address the research problem and central theme or phenomenon of the study (Creswell, 
2009). Creswell (2009) states maximum variation is a strategy used to ensure participant 
diversity and differentiation.  
Assumptions 
Although HBCUs need to have continuity of operations plans in place to ensure 
continuation of their essential processes in an emergency situation, there is an absence of 
research on what, if anything, HBCUs have done or are doing in this regard. Without 
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such planning, HBCUs are leaving themselves vulnerable to a major disruption of their 
academic process. 
In this study, it was assumed that the person providing information on behalf of 
an HBCU has sufficient knowledge and responsibility for emergency operations to 
describe the institution’s preparedness suitably. This assumption may not always be true. 
For instance, it may be difficult to ascertain the level of respect that the person 
responsible for emergency operations planning has with university administrators and 
throughout the campus community. Administration may not be forthcoming with 
admitting to their lack of respect for this person’s professionalism or competence. The 
ostensibly responsible person may be saddled with too many other responsibilities, such 
as transportation or parking control, with a limited staff, or this person may not be fully 
informed as the measures that the university has implemented.  
Scope and Delimitations 
Four Alabama HBCUs were chosen for this qualitative case study. Diversity was 
achieved by utilizing a purposeful sample including at least one institution from each of 
three categories: a private HBCU, a public HBCU, and a 2-year HBCU. The institutions 
chosen were geographically diverse with exposure to a multitude of weather related 
hazards. I chose study participants based upon their location to metropolitan areas, close 
proximity to nuclear power plants, and close proximity to military bases. The institutions 
chosen offered the needed diversity and geographical location representation.. 
The goal was to utilize a purposeful sample that would produce rich data 
applicable to HBCUs across the country with exposure to the same hazards as the 
participating institutions. 
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Limitations 
My study was limited by the fact that the topic dealing with continuity of 
operations planning at institutions of higher education has not been adequately researched 
for the establishment of a suitable baseline. I was not able to assess the extent of 
academic continuity without first developing a model of what academic continuity 
constitutes. In the absence of adequate extant literature and studies in the area of 
academic continuity, I drew upon the following to develop a model: 
 My years of experience working at an HBCU where I had held continuity of 
operations planning responsibilities 
 My recent FEMA training and certification in the area of continuity of 
operations planning, and my participation in a FEMA sponsored working 
group on the topic of academic continuity from a broad perspective. 
 Continuity of operations planning concepts outlined in Continuity Guide 
Circular 1 (FEMA, 2013) 
To bring balance to my conception of what academic continuity should look like 
at an HBCU, I used FEMA’s Continuity Guide Circular 1 (2013) as my overarching 
reference. Although the emphasis of this document is not directed toward IHEs, it 
discusses basic, foundational principles of continuity of operations planning. 
There may have been a perception of bias in my selection of the study 
participants. I have been an active member of the Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities Law Enforcement Executive Administrators (HBCU-LEEA) since 2008. I 
was an executive board member of this organization, serving in the capacity of recording 
secretary, from 2012 to 2014. In this capacity, I was the voice of the association to the 
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membership through emails that alerted them to employment opportunities, training 
opportunities, the annual conference, calls for presentations, equipment resources, grant 
opportunities, and other association matters. I have had a very visible presence at the 
annual conferences and I have visited several HBCUs in connection with my attendance 
at trainings and conferences. Based on these contacts, I have a professional relationship 
or familiarity with most of the HBCU chiefs of police, public/campus safety directors, 
and security directors. These individuals are generally responsible for spearheading 
emergency management and academic continuity planning on their campuses. Rather 
than viewing these existing relationships as a factor that could inject bias into my 
research, I saw them as an overall benefit. Through professional relationships, trust is 
developed. Trust was a key factor in encouraging participation in my study and inspiring 
openness in discussing what, in some cases, maybe disparaging information on the extent 
of academic continuity planning at the respondents’ institutions. I believe that my 
relationships with my colleagues did not create an aura of bias but, rather a situation that 
was conducive to a spirit of cooperation and candor, which was essential to the success of 
this study. By not identifying the respondents by name or geographical area, respondents 
were protected from identification. 
Significance of the Study 
This study is significant because it adds to the limited knowledge base on 
academic continuity at HBCUs. The results of this study have broad application to all 
HBCUs and to the higher education community in general. Emergency management is 
still an emerging field, with limited study conducted on disaster planning at IHEs or on 
academic continuity planning specifically. By researching the extent of academic 
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continuity planning at HBCUs in Alabama, I have contributed to the development of 
disaster resilience, which is important to the viability and sustainability of these historic 
institutions serving a segment of society that may not otherwise be able to receive a 
quality education. 
Summary 
Continuity of operations planning in higher education, also referred to as 
academic continuity, is a rather new concept that has emanated from standard continuity 
of operations planning, which has a wide application for government, businesses, and 
nonprofit organizations.  
HBCUs have a long legacy of providing educational opportunities to African-
Americans. Without these historic institutions, many African Americans would be unable 
to obtain a quality education (Nichols, 2004). It is important for these institutions to build 
resiliency against disasters and to have mechanisms in place to continue their academic 
and operational processes with little or no interruption. Continuity of operations planning 
can provide guidance in sustaining these institutions during and after disasters. However, 
only a few studies have been conducted and minimal literature is available on continuity 
of operations planning in higher education specifically or takes into account the 
complexities inherent in IHEs. Continuity of operations planning must consider the 
delivery of instruction, the continuation of critical research, care for laboratory animals 
and specimens, operations of medical facilities, and many other mission-essential 
functions during any type of natural or manmade disaster, ranging from severe weather to 
flu pandemic that requires quarantining.  
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It was not known how well HBCUs have prepared to continue the education 
process and associated ancillary mission-essential functions during and after a disaster 
prior to my study. Through a qualitative case study approach, I attempted to grasp the 
extent of academic continuity planning at HBCUs in Alabama, along with impediments 
that are hindering planning efficacy. This study will have major significance by adding to 
the knowledge base regarding academic continuity. In addition, this study will have broad 
applicability to all HBCUs throughout the nation.  
In Chapter 2, the literature review methodology employed in this study and the 
available literature on academic continuity has been detailed. In addition, comprehensive 
information is provided on the theoretical foundation for the study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
HBCUs are susceptible to a surfeit of disasters based on their geographical 
locations, such as exposure to severe weather events, unforeseen pandemics, and acts of 
terrorism. These disasters all have the potential to disrupt and even suspend the 
performance of mission-essential functions at these institutions. Mission-essential 
functions at IHEs include the delivery of instruction, research activities, care for 
laboratory animals and specimens, housing, major sporting events, food service, and 
various other ancillary functions that support the overall operations of the institution. 
An extant body of literature and federal guidelines set forth the manner in which 
IHEs should prepare for disasters. Even though current literature and federal guidelines 
indicate the need for continuity of operations planning at IHEs, there is minimal specific 
guidance for IHEs. This study was designed to identify the extent of continuity of 
operations planning, also commonly referred to as academic continuity, at HBCUs in the 
state of Alabama. The results of this study have broad application to HBCUs throughout 
the United States and to predominantly white institutions in establishing the need for 
specific continuity of operations planning guidance in higher education. 
Existing Literature and Domain Knowledge 
Current literature and guidelines relative to continuity of operations planning in 
higher education were mainly developed after Hurricane Katrina and have generally been 
referred to as academic continuity (SchWeber, 2007). The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation 
sponsored the Sloan Consortium which developed an online academic portal for students 
at IHEs impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Lorenzo, 2008). From this successful 
impromptu initiative, working groups were formed, studies were conducted, and 
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literature was published in peer-reviewed journals and periodicals concerning the concept 
of academic continuity. Government publications, professional associations, and trade 
groups issued anecdotal guidelines on academic continuity. Several IHEs developed and 
published their own protocols for academic continuity on their websites, and these have 
become a standard for peer institutions. These publications, studies, and guidelines 
encompass the academic continuity body of knowledge. 
While some information pertaining to academic continuity is available through a 
hodgepodge of literature, studies, guidelines, working groups, and university websites, 
the extent of focus on academic continuity pales when compared to the increasing 
emphasis on mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery—the cornerstones of 
emergency management and disaster preparedness that receive substantial funding, and 
government and media attention. This imbalance is evidenced in a recent guideline on 
how to develop emergency operations plans for IHEs, published jointly by the FEMA, 
and the U.S. Department of Education. In this 88-page document, the U.S. Department of 
Education (2013) designates less than a half page to academic continuity planning. In 
comparison, multiple pages are devoted to FERPA, HIPAA, and other regulatory matters 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2013). There is even a reference to finding more 
information on academic continuity planning in a Resource section that does not exist. 
There is an overall lack of detailed information on academic continuity planning 
in higher education. Furthermore, there is virtually no information available on how 
HBCUs are using available resources to plan for academic continuity on their campuses.  
In this chapter, I have detailed the methodology used to search for literature on 
COOP in higher education, some of which was relevant even if dated. The literature is 
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categorized into five areas: (a) the state of HBCUs; (b) government guidelines; (c) 
professional association publications; (d) peer-reviewed and general literature; and (e) 
university websites. As noted, a significant number of studies appeared during the year 
immediately after Hurricane Katrina (Gasman & Drezner, 2007; Johnson, 2011; Stein et 
al., 2007). It appears that for a short while, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were the catalysts 
for increased interest in planning for disaster response (Beggan, 2011). However, 
government and professional association publications were found to only provide 
anecdotal and cursory information on COOP for IHEs. In addition, I reviewed literature 
that detailed the tenuous state of many HBCUs, as this concern provided the impetus for 
embarking upon the present study to ascertain the extent of HBCUs’ COOP. 
Literature Research Strategy 
In order to gain a sense of the condition of HBCUs, I researched databases using 
the search terms HBCU, historically Black, minority serving, and United Negro College 
Fund. For information on COOP in higher education, the search terms academic 
continuity, COOP, disaster preparedness, disaster planning, higher education, higher ed, 
pandemic, emergency management, and emergency operations were employed. The 
Walden University library was used to access journal articles, studies, and dissertations. 
The databases accessed included CINAHL Plus, Academic Search Complete, ERIC, 
Education Resource Complete, ProQuest Central, Thoreau, Homeland Security Digital 
Library, Sage Encyclopedias, and Dissertations and Theses at Walden University. 
The Plight of HBCUs 
The body of literature reviewed on the status of HBCUs was diverse in its 
relevance and validity. While the mainstream media have generally portrayed HBCUs as 
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irrelevant, deficient in finances, plagued by miniscule endowments, and weak in 
leadership (Gasman & Bowman, 2011), there has been an absence of empirical studies to 
confirm these allegations. With the exception of the considerable research conducted by 
Gasman and Bowman (2011), most of the literature has been “heavily colloquial and 
anecdotal” (Brown, 2013, p. 4). There appear to be three distinct perspectives on HBCUs. 
Proponents extol the high percentage of Ph.D.’s, teachers, dentists, medical doctors, 
military officers, federal judges, and other professionals who have graduated from 
HBCUs (Nichols, 2004; Brown, 2013). Detractors question the relevance of these 
institutions, pointing to studies and media reports touting weak leadership, low 
graduation rates, and financial woes (Brown, 2013; Gasman & Nelson, 2011). Finally, a 
more balanced perspective views these institutions as treasures of the community based 
on the educational opportunities that they have provided to African Americans, and it 
contends that these institutions have been funded disparately and unfairly characterized 
and lumped together by the media and political quarters (Johnson, 2011; Gasman & 
Drezner, 2007). 
Several studies have highlighted the number of successful HBCU graduates in 
numerous fields (Nichols, 2004; Stewart et al., 2008). More recent studies have also 
reflected the positive function of HBCUs in providing leadership opportunities, role 
models, and the promotion of African American history and culture (Brown, 2013). Some 
recent studies have promoted the positive attributes of HBCUs from a defensive position, 
seeking to offset the criticism that these institutions have received (Gasman & Bowman, 
2011). In combination, these various perspectives indicate the evolving role of HBCUs 
over the years and how they have now come under attack. 
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The mainstream media frequently do not paint a favorable picture of HBCUs, 
thereby helping to influence broader opinion that these institutions are no longer viable 
(Gasman & Bowman, 2011). Media sources have brought the very existence of these 
schools into question, characterizing them as “endangered institutions” (Brown, 2013, p. 
10). Some of the key allegations are that HBCUs suffer from poor leadership, inadequate 
concepts of governance, and financial mismanagement (Brown, 2013; Drezner & Gupta, 
2012; Gasman, 2010; Gasman & Bowman, 2011; Stuart, 2013). It appears that HBCUs 
leaders who fail draw more attention than failed leaders at PWIs (Gasman & Bowman, 
2011). Moreover, when leaders fail or a financial crisis ensues at an HBCU, reports often 
indicate that the problem is systemic and a broad brushstroke is used to paint all HBCUs 
as having similar problems. Such allegations, often based on outdated studies and spouted 
by op-ed writers who have never set foot on an HBCU campus (Brown, 2013; Drezner & 
Gupta, 2012; Gasman & Bowman, 2011), have placed HBCUs on the defensive and in a 
constant cycle of justifying their relevance and existence—a situation that PWIs and 
religiously affiliated IHEs rarely face (Brown, 2013; Drezner & Gupta, 2012; Gasman & 
Bowman, 2011). 
Another area that generates negative publicity for HBCUs is their low graduation 
rates (Toldson & Cooper, 2014). However, critics generally overlook the fact that 
HBCUs do not receive the same level of funding as their PWI counterparts and thus often 
struggle to provide comparable resources to enhance the learning environment (Bowman, 
2009; Johnson, 2011). Endowments (or the lack thereof) play a major role in the financial 
health, capital improvements, and scholarship availability at HBCUs (Coupet & Barnum, 
2010). HBCUs tend to have very low endowments compared to PWIs (Drezner & Gupta, 
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2012). Despite many notable exceptions, their graduates tend overall not to attain the 
same level of career success as graduates of PWIs, thereby limiting the amount of 
disposable income that can be contributed back to their alma maters (ASHE, 2010). 
A study conducted by Gasman (2010), as a member of an investigative team that 
assessed the termination of 55 faculty members at Clark Atlanta University, is a good 
example of the application of a balanced perspective in assessing an HBCU. The 
president of Clark Atlanta University fired the faculty members in 2009, claiming 
financial exigency (Gasman, 2010). Many of the faculty members had tenure. Gasman 
(2010) states the American Association of University Professors was notified of the 
incident and engaged the expert services to determine if due process had taken place and 
if there were any violations of governance. Gasman (2010) reported that her team found 
poor leadership and a labyrinthine governance situation, along with a still very dedicated 
faculty who had labored at salaries of $45,000 per year as tenured associate professors. 
Gasman spoke against the common practice of comparing HBCUs to their more wealthy 
PWI counterparts (2010). Gasman and Drezner (2007) pointed out the disparate levels of 
funding (compared to PWIs) given by states to public HBCUs and by foundations and 
corporate sources to private HBCUs. 
An  analysis of HBCUs was published by Toldson and Cooper (2014) from the 
White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities. Toldson and 
Cooper (2014) ranked HBCUs with regard to graduation rates, student retention, 
endowment size, enrollment increases and decreases, grants and contracts, and frequency 
of leadership changes. There is, however, very little commentary on or interpretation of 
the data. 
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The literature reviewed on the condition of HBCUs can be interpreted in several 
ways because there is an insufficient amount of empirical information by which to make 
a conclusive judgment on the viability of these institutions. However, what can be 
deduced from the literature, studies, and commentaries is that these institutions are 
closely watched, their relevance is constantly challenged, critical questions are raised 
concerning graduation rates in spite of a lack of funding and meager endowments, and 
concerns about leadership and governance are increasing (Toldson & Cooper, 2014; 
Gasman, 2010; Johnson, 2011; Bowman, 2009; Drezner & Gupta, 2012; Gasman & 
Bowman, 2011).  
The comparison of HBCUs to PWIs has not been an issue in the context of 
academic continuity. However, the relevance of HBCUs’ fiscal limitations in this context 
is that many of them can ill afford to be impacted by a disaster that would portend a 
significant interruption of the education process and major property damage (Johnson, 
2011). Hurricane Katrina is a constant reminder of the impact that a disaster can have on 
HBCUs. According to Gasman and Drezner (2007), HBCUs tend to be located on 
“undesirable land”  (p. 35) that is susceptible to natural and manmade disasters. For 
instance, Xavier University, Dillard University, and Southern University of New Orleans 
are all situated at low elevations (Johnson, 2011). The absence of business interruption 
insurance due to the high premiums, miniscule endowments that do not provide for 
reconstruction, loss of student enrollment and ensuing tuition (which is the primary 
revenue source at HBCUs), employee terminations, and drastic elimination of academic 
programs can be devastating (Gasman, 2010; Gasman & Drezner, 2007; Johnson, 2011; 
Drezner & Gupta, 2012). Johnson (2011) states recovery funding has not recognized the 
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HBCUs’ greater levels of need. According to Johnson (2011), there were many problems 
associated with the allocation of funds for rebuilding IHEs in Mississippi and Louisiana 
after Hurricane Katrina. The funds were distributed equally to each institution without 
regard to need. Hence, institutions in central and northern Louisiana that had received 
minimal wind damage received the same funding as Dillard, Xavier, and Southern. No 
consideration was given to IHEs’ capacity to rebuild based on the size of their 
endowments. For example, Southern University of New Orleans, with an endowment of 
$2 million, received the same federal and state aid as did Loyola University with an 
endowment of $300 million (Johnson, 2011). In short, for HBCUs, conducting academic 
continuity planning to build disaster resiliency on their campuses may be critical to their 
survival if a disaster should occur. 
Government Guidelines 
The federal government has issued Continuity Guidance Circular 2 (FEMA, 
2013), has served as the overarching document for COOP in nongovernment sectors. This 
document provides a foundation for the concept of academic continuity. It provides 
general information on how to identify functions that must take place (mission-essential 
functions or MEFs) in an organization (2013). For IHEs, these functions generally 
include instruction, research, housing, and food service (U.S. Department of Education, 
2013). Instruction is given in exchange for payment of tuition, which is the primary 
revenue source for IHEs (Johnson, 2011). Research infuses grant funding into IHEs and 
is thus another major source of income, according to Johnson (2011). In addition, 
research projects can take years to come to fruition. The loss of research specimens, 
laboratory animals, and research data can be a devastating blow both financially and to 
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the reputation of an institution. A loss of electrical power for an extended length of time 
due to a tornado, hurricane, ice storm, or an act of terrorism can bring institutional 
research to a halt. 
In additional to outlining mission-essential functions, the Continuity Circular 
Guide (FEMA, 2013) outlines multiple steps that should be taken to plan for delegation 
of authority, succession, devolution, and reconstitution. These concepts can be adapted to 
higher education with varying levels of success. A good example is the process of 
devolution. FEMA (2013) outlines how this activity that government agencies can often 
carry out without consequences. If a particular federal or state agency is unable to 
perform its mission-essential functions, those functions may be transferred to another 
location of the same agency. For example, if the mission-essential functions of NASA’s 
Huntsville, Alabama facility cannot be performed, all operations are transferred to 
Houston. The employees at Huntsville would remain in Huntsville while the Houston 
location would take on additional responsibilities with its current staff. In higher 
education, however, devolution generally has considerable negative consequences 
(2013). First, most IHEs do not have a continuity facility or another campus to which all 
functions can be transferred. Second, it may be possible to relocate the function, but the 
process of relocating students on a temporary basis, or transporting them on a daily basis 
to the new location, can be a logistical nightmare. Third, devolution is not a viable option 
for IHEs engaged in research. Even though it may be possible to relocate research 
animals and specimens, the original researchers who have proprietary knowledge of the 
research must still perform the research. Fourth, relocating students and functions to 
another IHE may result in the loss of students from the original institution in subsequent 
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years (Crawford et al, 2008). In a study conducted by Crawford (2008), Tulane 
University experienced such a loss when it devolved its medical school to the University 
of Texas Medical Center in Houston. Many medical students chose to remain in Houston 
to complete their studies rather than return to Tulane University. Furthermore, this 
devolution of a medical program required restructuring of courses and curriculum that 
presented a challenge for students. Subsequently, the students’ scores on national 
examinations decreased significantly (Crawford, 2008). 
The National Incident Management System Incident Command System Emergency 
Responder Field Operations Guide (Department of Homeland Security, 2010) offers 
guidance on how to implement concepts of the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) at the operational level. The NIMS is a 
scalable template that is used nationwide to facilitate government and non-governmental 
agencies working together to “prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and 
mitigate the effects of incidents” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). The NIMS 
signifies a core set of doctrines that include common terminology, concept of operations, 
and organizational processes that are necessary for an effective collaborative response to 
disasters (2010). ICS is the operational component of NIMS that delineates leadership 
roles and functional responsibilities focused on planning, operations, finance, and 
logistics (2010). Continuity of operations plan and emergency operations plan activations 
in higher education must occur within the framework of NIMS and ICS for effective 
response and recovery coordination (2010). 
Several federal agencies collaborated to produce the Guide for Developing High-
Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher Education (U.S. 
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Department of Education, 2013). This document provides minimal guidance on 
continuity of operations planning for higher education. The U.S. Department of 
Education (2013) gives a one-paragraph overview of continuity of operations planning 
and then lists four bullet points on what should be considered in carrying out this activity. 
The document builds upon the Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions 
of Higher Education (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). 
The Results of the National Campus Safety and Security Project Survey (National 
Association of College and University Business Officers, 2009) indicate that only 30% of 
respondents had a business continuity plan in place to ensure recovery should a disaster 
take place. Twenty-eight percent responded that a business continuity plan was being 
drafted. This document does not contain any guidance on how IHEs should prepare for 
academic continuity. 
Professional Association Publications 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Disaster Recovery Institute 
International, ASIS International, and the Business Continuity Institute have all produced 
guidelines focused on business continuity plan development. Although business 
continuity planning and COOP have similar components, the former is more involved 
with preservation of supply chains, business records, and information technology 
functions. None of these entities’ publications delve into the peculiarities of academic 
continuity with the exception of NFPA 1600, Standard on Disaster/Emergency 
Management and Business Continuity Programs (NFPA, 2010). This extensive document 
devotes only two paragraphs to planning for alternate sites, identifying functions that 
must be maintained, vital records, resources needed, and planning for recovery. 
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Business continuity planning is a sub-specialty of COOP designed to assist 
business in planning for the continuation or resumption of manufacturing, service 
delivery, and product sales functions during and after a disaster (Business Continuity 
Institute, 2013). It is a good model for IHEs to follow in developing a similar sub-
specialty devoted to academic continuity. 
Peer-Reviewed Articles and General Literature 
Literature pertaining to academic continuity at IHEs was produced mainly in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. SchWeber’s (2008) study indicates the concept of 
continuity of operations planning in higher education can be traced back to September 
1939 in France, when World War II was declared. France’s education minister at the time 
conferred with the French president and suggested that a structure be established to 
continue the education process. This resulted in a correspondence course program that is 
still in place today, involving over 350,000 students. 
The primary approach to academic continuity today has not veered far from this 
1939 effort. The emphasis is still on distance learning as an alternative to a brick-and-
mortar learning environment (Lorenzo, 2008). With the onset of the Internet and 
advances in other technologies, distance learning can be accomplished via several 
platforms, including email, videoconferencing (Skype, Google Hangout), podcasts, and 
specifically designed online portals such as Blackboard and D2L (Coyner, 2011). 
Lorenzo (2008) detailed how the Sloan Consortium initiated the “Sloan Semester” 
to assist students attending IHEs that were impacted by Hurricane Katrina, enabling them 
to continue their education in an online environment. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the 
architects of the Sloan Semester had discussed online learning options in the event of a 
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flu pandemic. Little did they realize that a hurricane would be the impetus for the 
development of an online course delivery program. Within an unprecedented 48 hours, 
the Sloan Semester organizers obtained $1.1 million in financing from the Sloan 
Consortium for the project (Lorenzo, 2008). Lorenzo (2008) states over the course of a 
weekend, a website was developed to allow affected students to log on and search for 
course offerings. Lorenzo (2008) estimates that by September 21, 2005, students were 
enrolled in over 1,345 accelerated online courses being offered by 135 institutions for 
that fall semester. Most of the courses began by October 10, 2005. 
The Sloan Semester was not without its problems (Lorenzo, 2008). There were 
issues associated with getting the impacted institutions to verify the current enrollment of 
students attempting to take online classes. Sometimes spam filters prevented email 
notifications from reaching students to advise them of their enrollment in a course. As 
new courses became available, students began dropping and adding courses—but no 
system had been set up to manage drops and adds. Finally, the cost of textbooks was not 
included in the Sloan Semester program funding. Families who had lost all their worldly 
possessions could hardly spend $100 for a textbook. Some students who enrolled in 
classes at the last minute did not receive their textbooks for several weeks, putting them 
behind in their studies. These were unique and unusual challenges since the project 
involved creating a system to enroll students from disparate institutions into courses 
being offered by a myriad of IHEs across the United States. The focus of preparedness 
now is for each IHE to have its own system in place a system for continuing the 
education process in a crisis situation; means of doing so can range from setting up tents 
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in campus parking lots (Wright & Wordsworth, 2013) to utilizing space in motels and 
churches or relying on established online delivery systems. 
Despite its difficulties, the Sloan Semester established online learning during a 
disaster as a proven option (Lorenzo, 2008). It also motivated IHEs across the nation to 
start planning for academic continuity. The Sloan Semester serves as a blueprint today for 
IHEs and is frequently referenced in the relatively few studies and working groups on the 
topic of academic continuity. 
A working group (University of Maryland, 2007) that was funded by a grant from 
the Sloan Foundation came together to focus collectively on academic continuity. The 
members of the working group included a cross-section of emergency management 
practitioners and academicians from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of Education, Sloan Consortium, Sloan Foundation, and IHEs. This was the 
first organized effort of record that considered academic continuity in terms of both 
continuing the delivery of instruction and also defining the support functions necessary to 
sustain the institution. The Sloan Semester did not have to contend with payroll, financial 
aid awards and refunds, residential life, food service, and other ancillary functions that 
IHEs must consider in their continuity of operations planning. 
The working group made several important observations (University of Maryland, 
2007). First, most IHEs have not established a solid relationship with state and local 
emergency management agencies. Second, IHEs have miniscule guidance or examples to 
follow in developing academic continuity plans. Third, no federal agency has been 
designated to take the lead in promoting academic continuity planning at IHEs. 
Unfortunately, these premises from 2007 remain true today. 
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The working group developed nine recommendations to lay the groundwork for 
sustainable academic continuity planning. These recommendations include the following 
(University of Maryland, 2007): 
 The establishment of a national center for the dissemination of resources and 
information 
 Engagement of regional accreditation bodies to require academic continuity 
planning for initial accreditation and subsequent renewal 
 Appointment of a board of subject matter experts to develop academic 
continuity planning standards 
 Pursue strategies to procure funding for academic continuity planning 
 Encourage IHEs to proactively pursue academic continuity planning 
 The appointment of a federal agency to spearhead academic continuity 
planning for IHEs 
 Encourage networking among higher education stakeholders and state and 
local emergency management agencies 
With the exception of the guidelines published jointly by the Department of 
Education and FEMA on developing overall emergency operations plans, there has been 
no discernible action on the recommendations of the working group, nor have any 
additional working groups been formed since then according to my research. 
Coyner (2011) recommended specifically that IHEs consider issues of academic 
continuity related to a pandemic. Coyner (2011) advocated for social distancing through 
distance learning as a means of slowing the spread of a contagious disease. In addition to 
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recommending instructional delivery methods such as online learning, correspondence, 
and the use of local radio and television stations (the last of which is improbable), Coyner 
(2011) also called for considering essential operations such as payroll, security, 
maintenance, custodial services, and food service. These essential functions tend to be 
overlooked in most documents that focus on how to continue the delivery of instruction 
during and after a disaster. 
Coyner (2011) recommended having plans in place to ensure academic integrity, 
planning for short-term and long-term disruptions, and contemplating how instruction 
will be delivered if there is an absence of technology. Coyner (2011) also discussed 
planning for internships and laboratory classes and ensuring that syllabi for each class 
contain an academic continuity component with assignments to be completed in the event 
that the class is no longer able to meet. 
Katz et al. (2012) offered further guidance on how to prevent the spread of 
influenza through proper continuity of operations planning, including alternative food-
service delivery for those who are ill and a revised absence policy. This study, although 
focused on the health behaviors of students during a flu pandemic, offered good practical 
information on sanitation practices to prevent the spread of infectious diseases as a subset 
of academic continuity. Katz’s (2012) premise was prevention can promote good health 
and thereby facilitate the continued delivery of instruction by healthy professors to 
healthy students. 
Several additional studies have contributed to the dialog on academic continuity 
in advance of infectious disease pandemics (American College Health Association, 2011; 
Zhang, May & Stoto, 2011). A task force appointed by the American College Health 
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Association (2011) focused on the four phases of emergency management in addition to 
some continuity of operations planning concepts, including alternative instruction 
delivery, alternative facilities, alternative food service, maintenance, custodial services, 
and other essential functions.  
Other earlier articles (five to ten years old) extolled the benefits of academic 
continuity planning with an emphasis on online education (Blackboard Inc., 2009; 
Ebersole, 2008; Henderson, 2005; McClure, 2010; Orlando, 2007; Young, 2009).  
Theoretical Foundation 
As outlined in chapter 1, the theoretical framework for this study was the 
resiliency theory, which evolved from the notion in physics of an object’s ability to 
“rebound or bounce” back from deformation or distress” (Plough et al., 2013; Norris et 
al., 2007). Within the behavioral sciences, resiliency is identified with individuals and 
their capacity to adapt to adverse situations. Comparisons have been conducted to 
understand why some individuals are able to adapt and others are not (Kim & Hargrove, 
2013; Plough et al., 2013). Further evolution of the concept of resiliency encompassed 
concerns for communities and their ability to sustain themselves or quickly recover in the 
face of adversity. 
Resiliency is the foundation of continuity of operations planning, which is 
focused on the ability to rebound or bounce back from a disaster while sustaining or 
expeditiously resuming the institution’s essential functions (Longstaff et al., 2010). An 
HBCU that has a continuity of operations plan in place has thereby increased its adaptive 
capacity to continue the performance of operations that are critical for survival. Both 
Tulane University and Dillard University exhibited adaptive capacity in the aftermath of 
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Hurricane Katrina by utilizing cruise ships and a hotel, respectively, to provide for 
housing, food service, and instruction (Crawford et al., 2008). 
Resiliency theory has become dominant in laying the foundation for the 
development of goals and policies that have become national in scope (Longstaff et al., 
2010; Plough et al., 2013) in addressing manmade and natural disasters. Resiliency 
theory is also applicable to complex systems such as IHEs. Plough et al. (2013) stated 
that resiliency is essential and directly applicable to communities that are marginalized, 
economically stressed, and vulnerable due to deficiencies in critical infrastructures. Many 
HBCUs find themselves in exactly this situation due to disparate funding, low alumni 
support, leadership shortcomings, and miniscule endowments (Toldson & Cooper, 2014; 
Gasman, 2010; Johnson, 2011; Bowman, 2009; Drezner & Gupta, 2012; Gasman & 
Bowman, 2011). 
Summary 
In general, the body of literature and studies relevant to continuity of operations 
planning at IHEs is limited and often dated. Government and professional association 
guidance on continuity of operations planning is lacking and weighted toward mitigation, 
preparation, response, and recovery. The literature reviewed in this chapter tends to 
promote academic continuity through online learning as the main methodology for the 
delivery of instruction in emergency situations. The literature is generally silent, 
however, on methodologies for continuing research, providing food service, and 
performing other essential functions germane to higher education. There is only general 
guidance on the need to have plans to address these essential ancillary functions. 
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No prior research was found that deals specifically with continuity of operations 
planning at HBCUs. HBCUs have established themselves as viable alternative IHEs for 
individuals who cannot qualify for admittance to PWIs or who desire a nurturing 
educational environment more aligned with their culture. The large number of successful 
graduates from these institutions has been well documented. However, many of these 
IHEs are facing a tenuous existence due to several factors that have been featured in the 
mainstream media and in a few scholarly studies. Hence, exploring the extent of 
continuity of operations planning at HBCUs in Alabama is critical to building resiliency 
at these institutions and eliminating a possible crucial weakness. The results of this study 
can be generalized to the larger population of HBCUs. 
Resiliency theory was identified as the most applicable theoretical framework for 
my study, based on its focus on the concept of adaptive capacity, which is very applicable 
to continuity of operations planning in higher education. Institutions that have adequate 
continuity of operations plans will be more prepared to adapt and bounce back from a 
disaster. This is the core element of resiliency theory. 
In chapter 3, the research design, methodology, and data collection procedures for 
the study are described. Chapter 3 explains the rationale for selecting a qualitative 
research approach and a case study design. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
The purpose of this study was to explore the extent of academic continuity 
planning at HBCUs in the state of Alabama. Academic continuity planning, which is 
closely related to and often referred to as continuity of operations planning in an 
academic environment, is the concept of planning for the continuation of essential 
functions, or the expeditious resumption of essential functions during and after a disaster 
that causes significant disruption (FEMA, 2013). This study was designed to investigate 
how academic continuity at HBCUs in Alabama can be strengthened. 
In order to explore the extent of academic continuity at the study participant 
institutions, it was necessary to conduct in-depth interviews and examine plans and other 
documents. Hence, I chose a qualitative methodology. A qualitative approach involving 
face-to-face interviews was conducive to the purpose of this study in that there were 
minimal risks to the participants of this study, and because such dialog was necessary to 
gain a thorough understanding of the extent of academic continuity planning, one that 
could not have been obtained from quantitative data alone. 
In this chapter, I have delineated the role that I assumed as a researcher; discussed 
in detail the methodology as it relates to the identified population, my sampling strategy, 
the estimated number of participants, and other factors; addressed matters of 
trustworthiness; and outlined how ethical procedures were followed. 
Research Design 
Based upon Creswell’s (2007) recommendation that no more than one or two 
central questions be asked, the following research questions were developed: 
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RQ1. What is the extent of continuity of operations planning at HBCUs in the state of 
Alabama? 
RQ2. What can be done to strengthen continuity of operations planning at these 
institutions? 
The central concern of this study is how well HBCUs have planned for the 
continuation of academic and ancillary functions on their campuses in the event of an 
imminent or actual disruptive critical incident. It is anticipated that there may be 
impediments to adequate continuity of operations planning. Identifying these 
impediments facilitated the development of strategies to strengthen academic continuity 
planning at these institutions. 
Research Tradition 
At the onset of the study, I began exploring the various traditions promoted by 
writers such as Creswell (2007, 2009) and Patton (2002). Whereas Patton (2002) outlined 
an exhaustive set of research traditions, Creswell (2007, 2009) limited his focus to five 
general traditions: narrative, grounded theory, ethnography, phenomenology, and case 
study. Creswell (2007) focused on these five traditions because they are the ones used 
most often in research studies. I explored the attributes of each tradition and their 
relevance to my research before choosing the case study approach. 
The narrative tradition involves studying the lives of individuals and often is 
intertwined with the life of the researcher for comparative purposes (Creswell, 2009). 
Even though in-depth interviews are required, as in the case study tradition, the narrative 
tradition also considers life histories and memoirs to reflect possible patterns that may be 
41 
 
cultural or social in nature (Patton, 2002). This tradition is based more on individuals as 
opposed to a program evaluation, which is what I was seeking to do in this study. 
The grounded theory tradition is based on generating a theory (Patton, 2002) or 
facilitating the emergence of a theory from multiple data collection levels involving 
interviews, observations, review of documents, and other data sources (Creswell, 2009). 
Even though multiple interviews were conducted and various levels of data collection 
took place in this study, there was no need for observations of study participants or for 
the generation of an emerging theory. Resiliency theory was sufficiently applicable to my 
study. 
The ethnography tradition focuses on people or cultural groups and their way of 
life (Patton, 2002). An ethnographic study may involve observing people or a cultural 
group over an extended period in their natural setting (Creswell, 2009). This tradition had 
no relevance to my study. 
Phenomenology had some applicability to my study in that a program being 
studied could qualify as a phenomenon (Patton, 2002). However, this tradition goes 
further to examine the human experience as the phenomenon, making it more skewed 
toward a humanistic approach as opposed to program evaluation (Patton, 2002). 
According to Creswell (2009), a researcher must set aside his or her own experiences so 
that greater understanding of the study participants can be attained. However, for this 
study, my own experience and training in continuity of operations planning at an HBCU 
formed a foundation for generating interview questions, reviewing existing plans, and 
facilitating an overall reference foundation. 
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According to the attributes of the case study tradition as outlined by Creswell 
(2009), a researcher deeply explores a “program, event, process, or activity” (p. 13). In 
this approach, an issue is studied by using one or more cases in a contextual setting. It is 
particularly conducive to purposeful sampling that involves cases that provide different 
perspectives. This approach was directly related to my intention to choose a small 
number of HBCUs in Alabama that are varied in their structure (private, public, technical 
college, community college, etc.) so that different perspectives can be derived from their 
continuity of operations planning as part of a holistic examination (Janesick, 2011). A 
case study tradition can involve examining a few cases and then looking for common 
themes that are germane to all the cases (Creswell, 2007). This research is intended to 
develop common themes that transcend all the study participants for external validity 
purposes. The case study was the methodology chosen for my study in that it was more 
applicable than the other approaches reviewed. 
The Researcher’s Role 
My role in the study was that of a “key instrument” (Creswell, 2007, p. 38) in that 
I collected data through interviews and examination of existing documents. I then 
analyzed the collected data.  
I had a cursory and informal professional relationship with some participants in 
the study. I am a former recording secretary and executive board member of the 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities Law Enforcement Executive Administrators 
(HBCU-LEEA). I served in this capacity from 2012 to 2014 and interacted with several 
campus law enforcement and security administrators from HBCUs in Alabama at the 
organization’s annual training conferences. In addition, some of the study participants 
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were familiar with me because I corresponded with the HBCU-LEEA membership via 
email and telephone calls on a regular basis. My professional association was in no way 
supervisory, and it did not involve any authority over the study participants. I recently 
served as chairperson of the Campus Safety and Resiliency Committee of the Historically 
Black Colleges and Universities Emergency Management Alliance. This organization, 
although currently relatively inactive, seeks to provide a networking platform to 
encourage African American students to consider a career in emergency management, 
encourage the development of emergency management academic programs at HBCUs, 
and build campus resiliency (HBCU-EMC, n.d.). I saw my contact with campus law 
enforcement and security executives through these two organizations as being a catalyst 
for garnering cooperation in the study and for ensuring openness for internal validity 
purposes. 
Methodology 
Participation Selection Logic 
The population for my study was the 15 HBCUs located in Alabama. From this 
population I drew a purposeful sample of four institutions that reflect diversity in terms of 
enrollment; public and private schools with 2-year, 4-year, and graduate programs. 
A purposeful sample strategy was chosen based upon the nature of the study that 
was conducted, and based upon Creswell’s (2007) assertion that this is a good approach 
for a qualitative study and for understanding the problem related to the research 
questions. A purposeful sample strategy employing the concept of maximum variation 
(Creswell, 2007) to ensure that the study participants are differentiated based upon 
predetermined diversity criteria will produce data that reflect different perspectives. 
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The specific criteria established for sample selection included diversity in 
geographical location, so as to account for exposure to weather-related disasters such as 
hurricanes in coastal Alabama, winter storms and tornadoes in the state’s northern region, 
earthquakes (the New Madrid fault), forest fires, and flash floods. Geographical diversity 
involved institutions in close proximity to military bases, nuclear plants, and institutions 
located in larger metropolitan areas where an act of terrorism, manmade disaster, or 
major criminal incident might occur. Diversity was sought relating to institution size, 
residential versus commuter schools, research focus versus liberal arts focus, and 
endowment size. Verification that institutions met the criteria was accomplished by 
reviewing statistical information from institution websites and demographic information 
from local government and economic development agencies. 
I specifically chose the four HBCUs in Alabama that met the referenced criteria 
for differentiation and then initiated contact on an informal basis by telephone. Once 
tentative agreement had been received for participation, a formal invitation to participate 
in the study was drafted and forwarded to respondents at the selected institutions. 
Instrumentation 
IRB approval was obtained before data collection was initiated. The IRB approval 
number for this study is 01-11-16-0334362. Data was collected through personal, audio-
recorded interviews and through review of emergency operations and continuity of 
operations plans at each institution when such plans existed. The primary interviewees at 
each school were the persons responsible for emergency management planning and 
operations—generally the public safety director, chief of police, or a designated 
emergency manager—or the person responsible for academic administration, typically 
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the provost, vice president of instruction, vice president for academic affairs, or a 
similarly titled administrator. 
The person responsible for emergency management planning was able to provide 
specific information on whether continuity of operations planning is taking place and to 
what extent. This person’s role was generally directed towards sustaining essential 
functions relating to safety, maintenance, housing, food service, information technology, 
financial aid, accounting, transportation, and related functions. The administrators 
interviewed, who are charged with academic programs and instruction, were able to 
articulate the extent of continuity of operations planning for sustaining the delivery of 
instruction and the continuation of research activities. The information that the 
respondents were asked to provide through interviews, along with my review of existing 
plans, and my review of government and industry guidelines established sufficient data to 
answer the research questions. 
Data Collection Plan 
Three sets of data were collected during the course of the study: one set from 
face-to-face interviews, another set of data from the review of participant emergency 
operations plans and continuity of operations plans, and the final set from a review of 
government and industry guidance on continuity of operations planning to establish a 
baseline for determining effective planning. The collection of these three sets of data 
corresponded to my first research question, which concerns the extent of continuity of 
operations planning at the participating institutions. The continuity of operations plans 
reviewed at one of the participant institutions had specific guidance and procedures for 
continuing operations. For the participants that did not have written continuity of 
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operations plans, the emergency operations plan in some instances were found to have a 
discussion of continuity of operations planning in the basic plan. I made inquiries as to 
how the planning process takes place, the composition of the planning team, revisions to 
the plan, whether the plan is reviewed by the local emergency management agency, and 
exercises that have been conducted to test the plan. As the researcher, I collected the data 
during the telephone interviews. All interviews were audio-recorded. Participants were 
informed in advance of the telephone interviews as to the nature of the questions that I 
would be asking and the documents that I would need to review for analysis. The 
responses to the interview questions asked were straightforward. Hence, there was no 
need for follow-up interviews. 
Data Analysis 
Interviews were transcribed and coded utilizing the software program NVivo for 
the development of common themes to answer the research questions. No discrepant 
information was found throughout the interview process. Hence, there was no need for 
conducting the second interviews for which I had originally planned. Available 
emergency operations plans and continuity of operations plans from the participating 
institutions were analyzed in the context of current studies and government continuity of 
operations planning guidelines to determine the extent of continuity of operations 
planning taking place. 
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness of findings is the overarching goal of validity and reliability. 
Reliability and validity are the mechanisms for demonstrating and communicating the 
level of rigor engaged in the research and the overall trustworthiness of the findings 
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(Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson & Spiers, 2002). Trustworthiness involves “credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability” (Morse et al., 2002, p. 2). Within these 
concepts are contained the strategies member checking, audit trail, peer debriefing, 
referential materials, and participant confirmation of results (Morse et al., 2002). Validity 
plays a strong role in credibility, dependability, and confirmability by ensuring that the 
results of the research are accurate, and the conclusions and interpretations can be trusted 
(Maxwell, 2013; Creswell, 2009). It is concerned with the question: did we actually 
measure what we intended to measure? Reliability is evident in certifying that the 
approach used by the researcher and the results developed are consistent and can be 
replicated by other researchers to obtain the same results (Creswell, 2009). 
A goal of trustworthiness is to make the research process transparent so that other 
researchers and readers of the findings can trace the decisions that were made, 
methodologies used, the analysis process, and the conclusions that have been drawn over 
the course of the study (Roberts, Priest & Traynor, 2006). Due to the iterative nature of 
qualitative research during the course of a study, it is important for researchers to move 
back and forth between the research question, data collection, analysis, and conclusions 
to insure that there is congruence throughout the process to bolster the trustworthiness of 
the study (Morse et al., 2002). It was my intention to employ strategies at the onset of my 
research to guide me in deciding when to modify, realign, or adjust the research process 
“to achieve reliability and validity and ensure vigor” (Morse et al., 2002, p. 10).  
Validity 
The validity process must begin with the selection of the study participants. 
Creswell (2007) states that purposeful sampling is the best strategy to use in a qualitative 
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study because it involves selecting participants who can directly provide information 
pertaining to the research problem and the “central phenomenon.”  Purposeful sampling 
should achieve representation to enhance the richness of the data that will be obtained 
that speaks to the central phenomenon. This sampling technique should consider 
participants with whom the researcher can establish a productive relationship and 
participants with whom a collegial relationship has already been established that will 
encourage uninhibited discourse (Maxwell, 2013). I chose four HBCUs in the State of 
Alabama that are diverse in their governance, size, educational offerings, location, and 
funding sources. The State of Alabama offered the largest number of HBCUs to select 
from in the United States (Brown, 2013). The diversity of the population from which my 
sample was drawn produced an abundance of information that was needed to answer the 
central research question. My eight year tenure at an HBCU in the State of Alabama was 
beneficial in establishing collegial working relationships with my counterparts. These 
relationships facilitated forthrightness in response to the interview questions and provided 
for introductions to additional individuals who needed to be interviewed at participant 
institutions. 
Triangulation is the process of gathering information from diverse resources 
inclusive of interview responses and documents to reduce the risk of personal bias and 
tunnel vision in order to add to the validity of a study (Maxwell, 2013; Creswell, 2009). 
Triangulation played a major role in my study to confirm participant responses to 
interview questions. For example, when a participant stated that the institution has a 
formal continuity of operations plan or a continuity of operations plan annex in their 
emergency operations plan, I asked to see the plan to confirm that such a plan exists. 
49 
 
Going a step further, the plan was reviewed to ascertain the comprehensiveness of 
continuity of operations planning. In several instances, the plan addressed how the 
instructional process will continue during and after a critical incident, however, it did not 
detail how research functions will continue. When a participant indicated that no plan 
existed, there was still a possibility that the institution had continuity of operations 
concepts integrated into their emergency operations plan. This was found to be the case 
when emergency operations plans were reviewed.  
It was assumed that participants might not have a good grasp of what is involved 
in continuity of operations planning. By reviewing the one continuity of operations plan 
at a participant institution, and in reviewing emergency operations plans at the other 
participant institutions, interview responses were validated. The review of documents 
directly linked to my research questions that sought to ascertain the extent of continuity 
of operations planning at participant institutions. 
Member checking is the technique of allowing study participants to review the 
conclusions that have been drawn from their interview (Morse et al., 2002). It gives the 
participant an opportunity to confirm the gist of their responses. If misinterpretations 
have occurred, the researcher can obtain clarification and make adjustments in the 
findings. I conducted member checking at the conclusion of each interview to insure that 
I had a good grasp of their responses, and to confirm that they fully understood the 
questions and responses they made. It was important to confirm their responses for 
overall theme development and data analysis (Creswell, 2009). 
Bias in my study was addressed by openly reflecting on my background, 
professional experience, training, and life experiences through a process of reflexivity. 
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Reflexivity is a self-awareness process that seeks to keep before a researcher an 
awareness of actions, suppositions, feelings, and perceptions throughout the data 
collection, interpretation, and drawing of conclusions (Darawsheh, 2014). Disaster 
planning and response is a major part of my background, professional experience, and 
training at a HBCU in the State of Alabama. The closeness I have to my dissertation topic 
lays a strong foundation for framing interview questions, reviewing documents with a 
critical eye, and identifying the best subjects to interview at participant institutions. What 
I had to guard against was allowing subjective views, perceptions, feelings, and 
speculations cloud aspects of my research. This was accomplished through a continuous 
process of reflexivity (Darawsheh, 2014). While employing my expertise in disaster 
planning and response during the course of the research, I took on a mindset of seeking 
new knowledge that helped increase my skill set in this area by learning from the 
participant institutions. This approach assisted me in recognizing that I do not have all the 
answers and that there is something to be learned from others. Open mindedness and 
humility mitigated against bias in this study. 
Reliability 
Reliability deals with the consistency of results. It may involve the credibility of a 
questionnaire and whether similar results will be obtained by different researchers using 
the same measurement instrument (Roberts et al., 2006). In essence, other researchers 
should be able to develop the same results and reach the same conclusions by following 
the steps used in the original study. Creswell (2009) confirms this when he states that 
reliability “indicates that the researcher’s approach is consistent across different 
researchers and different projects” (p. 190).   
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Reliability was enhanced in my study by creating an audit trail, reviewing 
transcripts for errors, taking an iterative approach versus a linear approach, and by using 
a quality software program for coding purposes. Roberts and Traynor (2006) recommend 
keeping detail notes on what, how, and why certain decisions were made during the 
research to increase reliability. Note taking involving every aspect of my research was 
crucial for creating an audit trail that can be followed by other researchers seeking to 
duplicate my research. Notes on decisions such as when to interview individuals at 
participant institutions were important. It was not feasible to conduct interviews at the 
beginning of school terms, during final exam periods, and during times leading up to 
homecoming, graduation, and major sporting events. The best time to conduct interviews 
were during summer months and other breaks or slow periods during the school year. For 
this study, interviews were conducted after the Spring semester registration, but prior to 
final exam weeks and graduation. Notes were written on the rationale for each interview 
question, setting and time of day for interviews, lead time given for the production of 
documents and the scheduling of interviews, how the data was organized, and the method 
used for transcription. As data was being collected, I started recording my general 
thoughts and impressions on the depth of the data, its applicability to the study, and its 
overall use (Creswell, 2009). The notes taken will serve as an audit trail for the study. 
Transcripts were reviewed for omissions and errors. This was accomplished by 
reading through the transcriptions as I listened to the audio recordings. An iterative 
approach that involves moving “back and forth between the data” (Roberts & Traynor, 
2006, p. 43) was used to ensure there was a firm connection between the data and 
interpretations. This approach also allowed for modifications and adjustments to be made 
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during the course of the research and guarded against drifting away from the central 
phenomena of the study.  
In lieu of hand coding the interview transcripts and documents, the software 
analysis program NVivo was used for this purpose. According to Miles, Huberman, and 
Saldana (2014) the main benefit of using Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software (CAQDAS) is the storage and retrieval of data, assignment of codes, and the 
creation of analytical audit trails. The latter benefit is directly related to the iterative 
nature of my research and data analysis involving ongoing reflection and interpretation. 
CAQDAS packages serve to document a researcher’s thoughts, hunches, and the logic 
used in drawing conclusions for reliability (Miles et al., 2014). Overall, CAQDAS 
packages are “efficient data management systems” (Carcary, 2011, p. 14) that are critical 
for tracking data analysis. Carcary (2011) states NVivo is a CAQDAS that has been 
thoroughly vetted having been used by over 400,000 researchers in more than 150 
countries. 
Ethical Procedures 
The extent of continuity of operations planning at the participating institutions 
was considered confidential information along with their emergency operations plans. 
These plans reflect the operational processes in place to address a disaster or critical 
incident. Public disclosure of such plans could leave these institutions vulnerable to a 
terrorist attack. A terrorist could cause a disruptive event and then sabotage continuity 
efforts by destroying continuity facilities, inflicting a virus on the online learning portal 
to disable the system, or targeting individuals who are in the order of succession. With 
these considerations in mind, it was my goal to maintain the anonymity of study 
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participants by identifying them solely by a coded system so that they cannot be 
identified. 
Anonymity was going to be especially critical to protect the study participants’ 
reputations if their institutions were found to be lacking in continuity of operations 
planning. Negative publicity directed at HBCUs regarding a lack of preparedness could 
fuel deeply ingrained stereotypes and negatively impact these institutions’ efforts to 
recruit students and philanthropic support. 
Summary 
My decision to use a qualitative, case study approach was based on the need to 
study a small, select group of participants constituting a purposeful sample. My role as 
the researcher facilitated information-rich interview sessions, since I drew upon my 
knowledge and experience in the area of continuity of operations planning at an HBCU in 
Alabama. Trustworthiness was ensured by adhering to best practices in participant 
selection, data collection, and data analysis that are relevant to qualitative research. Care 
was taken to protect the anonymity and thereby the reputation of study participants. 
Chapter 4 contains an overview of the data collected and the research results 
along with the strategies used to reflect evidence of trustworthiness.  
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to explore the extent of continuity of operations 
planning at HBCUs in Alabama. In an academic environment, continuity of operations 
planning, also referred to as academic continuity, is involved with continuing or 
expeditiously resuming mission essential functions during and after a disaster. Mission 
essential functions can be defined as operations that must take place for the sustainment 
and continuation of the academic process (FEMA, 2013). Mission essential functions can 
include instruction, research, major sporting events, food service, and ancillary functions 
such as payroll, security, library services, and financial aid disbursements (Coyner, 
2011). This study is also designed to investigate how academic continuity at HBCUs in  
Alabama can be strengthened by identifying impediments to planning. The identification 
of impediments and obstacles will facilitate the development of mitigation strategies so 
academic continuity planning can take place. 
The central phenomenon is continuity of operations planning in a higher 
education setting. The following two research questions provided the foundation for 
studying this phenomenon: 
RQ1: What is the extent of continuity of operations planning at HBCUs in the State of 
Alabama? 
RQ2: What can be done to strengthen continuity of operations planning at these 
institutions? 
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This chapter delineates the results of the research to include data collection 
methods, data analysis, the coding method, theme development, review of government 
guidelines and institution plans, and the rationale for selecting study participants.  
Participant Selection 
HBCUs in the State of Alabama were chosen because Alabama has the highest 
number of HBCUs in the country with 15 institutions of higher education that fit into this 
category. Furthermore, the State of Alabama is susceptible to the following hazards based 
upon several factors: 
 Weather related hazards 
 Hurricanes in Southern Alabama from the Gulf of Mexico 
 Ice and snow storms in Northern Alabama 
 Earthquakes in Western Alabama due to proximity to the San Madrid fault 
 Tornadoes in Northern and Central Alabama due to the confluence of 
warm gulf air meeting cooler air from a western flowing jet stream 
 Flashfloods in Northern Alabama 
 Forest fires due to the amount of timber throughout the state 
 Acts of Terrorism 
 Military installations in the state 
 Nuclear power plants in the state 
 Populated cities such as Birmingham, Huntsville, and Mobile 
The 15 HBCUs in Alabama are located in each of the areas where hazards are 
prevalent and acts of terrorism can occur.  
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Table 1 identifies the HBCUs in the State of Alabama 
Table 1 
List of HBCU’s in the State of Alabama in alphabetical order 
Institution    Public or Private 2 Year, 4 Year, or Technical 
Alabama A & M University  Public   4 Year 
Alabama State University  Public   4 Year 
Bishop State Community College Public   2 Year 
Concordia College   Private   4 Year 
Shelton State Community College Public   2 Year 
Gadsden State Community College Public   2 Year 
Lawson State Community College Public   2 Year 
Miles College    Private   4 Year 
Oakwood University   Private   4 Year 
Selma University   Private   4 Year 
J.F. Drake Technical College  Public   2 Year 
Stillman College   Private   4 Year 
Talladega College   Private   4 Year 
Trenholm State Community College Public   2 Year 
Tuskegee University   Private   4 Year 
 
In keeping with Creswell’s (2007) guidance on using a purposeful sample, 
participants for the study were selected based upon his concept of maximum variation to 
insure that the participants represented a diverse mix of 2-year, 4-year, public, and private 
HBCUs. In addition, the institutions were selected based upon the diversity of their 
geographic location. The following are additional variations that were considered: 
 Research and non-research institutions 
 Institutions with housing on campus and commuter institutions with no housing 
 Institutions with and without food service 
 Institutions with emergency operations plans online 
 Institutions with accessible individuals with knowledge of emergency operations 
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Finally, consideration was given to having representation by HBCUs that had 
experienced a disastrous event within the past 7-years. This was an important 
consideration to determine how these institutions responded to the event with or without 
continuity of operations plans in place. A good response would indicate that appropriate 
academic continuity planning was effective in maintaining mission essential functions, or 
for the expeditious resumption of these functions. Having participants in the study that 
had experienced a disastrous event offered a better gauge on the extent of continuity 
planning than an institution that has a continuity of operations plan that has never been 
tested in a real-life situation. Two of the four HBCUs that agreed to participate in the 
study have been exposed to a disastrous weather event within the past 7-years. One of the 
two participant institutions that experienced a disastrous event had to close for several 
days near the end of a semester. The other institution that experienced a disaster had to 
close one of its campuses and move all academic functions to another campus.  
Four HBCUs were selected and agreed to be participants in this study. Each 
participant was assigned a code name for confidentiality purposes. The code names 
consisted of letters and numbers that were based upon a key kept in a confidential file 
folder. The geographical vicinity of the participants is not identified in this study to keep 
the identity of the participants confidential. In some geographical areas, there is only one 
HBCU. Through the process of deduction, certain participant schools could be identified 
if geographical vicinities are listed. 
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Table 2 reflects minimal demographic information on the HBCUs in Alabama 
that agreed to be participants for the study:  
Table 2 
Information on the participant institutions  
Code Classification Level Experienced Disaster 
B22 Public 2 Year Yes 
M23 Private 4 Year No 
T24 Private 4 Year No 
DM25 Public 2 Year Yes 
 
The person interviewed at institution B22 has overall responsibility for emergency 
operations planning and continuity of operations planning. This person serves in an 
administrative position at the institution and has had military experience in disaster 
response with assignments to emergency operations centers and appointments to disaster 
control groups. The person interviewed has administrative responsibilities for security, 
emergency management, physical plant, construction, and capital projects. The institution 
has no on-campus housing or food service. The disaster experienced by the institution 
occurred within a 7-year period and was weather related. The impact of the event cut off 
electrical power to the institution for an extended number of days during the academic 
school year. The institution does not have a written emergency operations plan nor does it 
have a written continuity of operations plan. At the time of the interview, an emergency 
operations plan was in the development stage. 
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Institution M23 has on-campus housing, food service, on-going research, a robust 
athletic program, and other functions that are common at a midsize institution of higher 
education. The person interviewed serves as the chief law enforcement officer at the 
institution with responsibility for both police operations and emergency management 
operations. The institution has not experienced any recent major disasters. The 
emergency operations plan for the institution was downloaded from the institution’s 
website. The person who was interviewed provided a continuity of operations plan for a 
department involved in animal research. The continuity of operations plan provided is the 
only written document governing continuity of operations planning at the institution. 
Institution T24 is a small private HBCU with on-campus housing, food service, a 
moderate athletic program, and minimal research activities. The person interviewed at 
this institution has extensive criminal justice experience and is the chief law enforcement 
official for the campus with responsibilities for police operations and emergency 
management operations. The person interviewed has not had formalized training in 
emergency management or continuity of operations planning. The institution’s 
emergency operations plan was downloaded from their website. 
Institution DM25 is a community college with several campuses. There is an 
absence of on-campus housing and significant food service. Two individuals were 
interviewed. Both individuals are administrators with one having direct responsibility for 
emergency management operations by title. The other individual has experience with 
administering a FEMA grant. Neither individual have had formalized training in 
emergency operations or continuity of operations. The institution experienced a weather 
60 
 
related disaster within the past 7-years. An emergency operations plan was downloaded 
from their website. 
Data Collection 
Data for this study came from semi-structured interviews with key individuals at 
the participant institutions. I conducted the interviews telephone and recorded each 
interview. In addition, available Emergency Operations Plans and Continuity of 
Operations Plans from participant institutions were reviewed. Finally, I reviewed federal 
government and industry guidelines Continuity Guidance Circular 1 (FEMA, 2013), 
Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of 
Higher Education (U.S. Department of Education, 2013), and NFPA 1600 Standard on 
Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (NFPA, 2010) for 
triangulation purposes. These guidelines, although limited in supplying an exhaustive 
overview of continuity of operations planning at institutions of higher education, assisted 
in establishing a baseline for determining the extent of continuity of operations planning 
at the participant institutions. 
Once participant institutions were selected based upon the criteria stated, an 
individual was identified at the institution that had overarching responsibility for 
emergency operations. This person is typically responsible or plays a major role in 
emergency operations planning and continuity of operations planning. At participant 
institutions B22 and M23, I was aware of the individuals with this responsibility through 
my leadership role as Recording Secretary for the Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities Law Enforcement Executive Administrators (HBCU-LEEA) from 2012 – 
2014. In my official capacity with the HBCU-LEEA, I had interacted with these 
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individuals and others holding similar positions throughout Alabama. My professional 
association with these individuals was in no way supervisory, and I have never had any 
authority over them.  
For institution participants T24 and DM25, I reviewed their websites to identify 
the individuals most likely to be involved in emergency management. Initial contact was 
made by telephone with the individual most likely to be involved in emergency 
operations at participant institution T24. This individual confirmed his overarching 
responsibility for emergency management operations and planning at the institution. At 
participant institution DM25, initial contact was made with a person identified in the 
online Emergency Operations Plan as having responsibility for plan development. This 
person, who serves as an administrator for the institution, confirmed that she is the 
primary person responsible for emergency operations planning. She further stated that 
another administrator at the participant institution could offer relevant information for my 
study. This second individual was contacted and agreed to provide input on the 
participant institution’s emergency operations planning. 
Interview Process 
The assumption was made that the individuals contacted at the participant 
institutions may not have a full understanding of continuity of operations planning at an 
institution of higher education. Before each interview was conducted, an overview was 
given that followed the verbiage outlined below: 
COOP is the process of planning for how mission essential functions will 
continue or quickly resume during and after a disaster causes a major disruption or 
stoppage of normal operations. This usually first involves identifying mission essential 
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functions which are functions that must take place for the sustainability and continuation 
of the organization operations. In an academic setting, mission essential functions may 
involve the delivery of instruction, on-going research, major sporting events, payroll, 
security, information technology, accounting, etc (Coyner, 2011). Once mission essential 
functions have been identified, the next course of action is for plans to be developed to 
insure mission essential functions can continue. According to Coyner (2011), the 
identification of alternative facilities, delegation of authority and succession planning, 
provisions for accessing vital records, alternative methods for communications, and 
returning to a state of normalcy are often the considerations of continuity of operations 
planning for an academic setting. 
After each individual at the participant institutions had been briefed and allowed 
to ask questions and make comments, I secured their verbal consent to be involved in the. 
Each individual was advised that a Consent Form would be forwarded by email or 
facsimile for his or her review, signage, and return. The consent form contained the 
following sample questions to further clarify the intent of the study and the nature of the 
questions that were going to be asked: 
 If a natural, mechanical, or manmade disaster should occur that cuts off 
electrical power for the campus while school is in session, how would the 
learning process continue? 
 What protocols are in place for sending notifications to the campus 
community during an emergency? 
 Is there a team or point person for spearheading emergency management 
operations, and if so, what is their function? 
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I scheduled a time for each interview that was convenient for the participant. 
Participants were made aware that the telephone interviews would last approximately 30 
minutes, and subsequent interviews might be needed to clarify points or to obtain 
additional information. Finally, I informed the participants that I would be requesting 
existing written plans relevant to emergency operations and continuity of operations from 
the participating HBUs. According to Creswell (2009), obtaining data from several 
sources such as interviews and the review of documents facilitates the development of 
themes. 
 Thirteen interview questions (Appendix B) were asked of each person 
interviewed. Some of the questions were not relevant to all the participant institutions. 
For example, institutions not engaged in research were not asked the question, “What 
plans are in place to care for laboratory animals and continue research during and after a 
disaster?” Furthermore, commuter participant institutions with no food service or on-
campus housing were not asked “What requirements are in place for vendors such as food 
service providers to continue or quickly resume operations during and after a disaster?” 
Finally, the administrators who were questioned were not asked the question “What 
support does administration provide for continuity of operations planning?” 
Telephone interviews took place from February 1, 2016 through February 8, 
2016. After each interview, I went back through the interview questions with the 
individuals interviewed and their responses as a form of member checking (Morse et al., 
2002, p. 2). Each individual was afforded the opportunity to receive a copy of the 
interview transcription. I double-checked the transcribed interviews for accuracy by 
listening to the interviews while reading the transcriptions. Based upon the 
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straightforward responses that were received, I determined there was no need to conduct 
follow-up interviews.  
The interviews were transcribed into Microsoft Word documents. Each 
transcription was then uploaded into the software program QRS NVivo 11. I embarked 
upon cleaning the data using the auto code feature of the program. I used the auto code 
feature to regroup the data based upon each research question. By doing this, I was able 
to review all the responses to each research question at one time instead of reviewing 
each transcribed interview separately to review responses. This measure assisted greatly 
in reviewing the responses for patterns and theme development. 
Patton (2002) recommends making several “reads” of the data to become more 
familiar with it, and to develop a coding system (p. 463). I read the interview responses 
several times to look for patterns and themes. Notes were made of similarities in 
responses and the themes and patterns that were beginning to emerge. In keeping with 
Creswell’s (2007) strategy of using “lean coding,” I established a short listing of parent 
nodes with expansion of these nodes with child nodes (p. 152). I was careful to keep the 
research questions in mind as I developed these nodes to insure that my research 
questions would be addressed. Table 3 reflects the parent and child nodes that developed: 
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Table 3 
Parent and Child Nodes  
Parent Nodes Child Nodes 
General knowledge of COOP  Formal training, practical work experience, 
COOP planning experience, COOP 
implementation 
COOP in action Pandemics, food service, housing, prior 
disaster response using COOP 
Responsibility for COOP Development Team approach, singular individual, 
administration 
COOP development support Administration, local emergency 
management agency 
COOP strengthening needs and 
impediments 
Training, overwhelmed with other tasks 
and priorities 
 
The parent nodes General Knowledge of COOP, COOP in Action, and 
Responsibility for COOP Development are directly related to the first research question 
“What is the extent of continuity of operations planning at HBCU’s in the State of 
Alabama?” In order to effectively conduct continuity of operations planning, one must 
first have a general knowledge of COOP through formal training which generally comes 
from FEMA online and face-to-face classes. Table 4 lists the COOP training classes 
offered by FEMA: 
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Table 4 
COOP Training 
Training Course Online Classroom 
IS-546.a Continuity of Operations Awareness Yes  
IS-547.a Introduction to Continuity of Operations Yes  
IS-548 Continuity of Operations Program Managers 
Train the Trainer Course 
Yes  
IS-524 Continuity of Operations Planners Train the 
Trainer Workshop 
Yes  
IS-545 Reconstitution Planning Workshop Yes  
IS-550 Continuity Exercise Design Course Yes  
IS-520 Introduction to Continuity of Operations Planning 
for Pandemic Influenza 
Yes  
IS-526 Mission Essential Functions Workshop Yes  
IS-551 Devolution Planning Workshop Yes  
 
The courses are free and can take from two to four hours to complete. Additional 
courses can be taken to attain the Professional Continuity Practitioner (PCP) and the 
Master Continuity Practitioner (MCP) certifications. However, certification is not needed 
in order to grasp an understanding of continuity of operations planning. The two basic 
courses IS-546.a Continuity of Operations Awareness and IS-547.a Introduction to 
Continuity of Operations will lay an adequate foundation for basic continuity of 
operations planning. 
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Practical work experience, COOP planning experience, and COOP 
implementation - child nodes of the parent node General Knowledge of COOP, are all 
intertwined with formal training. They are actually building blocks. Formal training in 
continuity of operations planning is foundational for work and planning experience. 
Successful implementation of continuity of operations will be an indicator of the level of 
training received that influenced the planning. If the formal training establishes a 
platform for good continuity of operations planning, then implementation will be 
successful.  
The parent node COOP in Action considers the responses to different types of 
disasters where continuity of operations plans were implemented, or not implemented. 
Relevant child nodes are Pandemics, Food Service, Housing, and Prior Disaster Response 
Using COOP. The child nodes were developed from interview question and responses. 
Parent nodes Responsibility for COOP Development, COOP Development 
Support, and COOP Strengthening Needs and Impediments are related to the second 
research question which asks, “What can be done to strengthen COOP at these 
institutions?” Interview questions that addressed administrative support, local emergency 
management agency support, team approach to plan development, and other priorities 
generated the parent and child nodes. 
Interview Responses – Analysis 
The purpose of asking the interview questions that were chosen was to gain 
insight into the extent of continuity of operations planning at the participant institutions 
and any evident impediments to planning and implementation of academic continuity. 
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There was some crossover in several of the questions that elicited responses that built 
upon several of the themes that developed. 
The following interview question was put forward to the individuals at the 
participant institutions, “What is your understanding of continuity of operations planning 
in an academic environment?” The responses to this basic question were surprising and 
ranged from direct answers to question avoidance. Table 5 details the responses that were 
received: 
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Table 5 
Understanding of COOP in an academic setting. 
 
 
Participant Response 
DM25 My background is counseling 
That everyone who needs to be informed be informed 
You know who to contact, you know where to go, you know that 
information  is disseminated 
T24 I haven’t had any really FEMA courses, but you’re talking to a 
Chief that I used to run all the jails in this area 
B22 Being able to continue to carry out your mission based on any 
interruption, power, or other essential element that you would 
need to continue on 
M23 Protocol that is followed to maintain the educational system once 
we’ve had a campus emergency or some type of natural disaster 
 
From the responses given by DM25 and T24, it was apparent they do not have a 
competent grasp on continuity of operations planning in an academic setting. This is the 
first question that was asked after my introduction and brief overview of the components 
of continuity of operations planning. Participants B22 and M23 demonstrated minimal 
understanding of continuity of operations planning in their responses. This first question 
laid the foundation for subsequent questions that were designed to elicit an understanding 
of continuity of operations planning. A simplistic theme was evident from the responses 
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to this question – either you understood the meaning of continuity of operations planning 
in an academic climate or you did not.  
The question was asked, “What has been your training and experience in 
continuity of operations planning?” T24 responded that no FEMA training had been 
received in general. DM25 mentioned that training had been received in hurricane 
preparedness and that one-on-one training for developing their emergency operations 
plan had been received from an “ex-military person.” M23 has received FEMA training 
in the Incident Command System. B22 had the most experience and training from 
military service inclusive of key roles in emergency operations centers, disaster control 
centers, and as part of a commander’s disaster planning group. T24’s lack of FEMA 
training probably contributes to substandard understanding of continuity of operations 
planning. The same holds true for DM25. The theme that emerged is a misunderstanding 
of what constitutes continuity of operations training relevant to the courses outlined on 
Table 4. Even though continuity of operations planning had been explained several times, 
there still was a tendency among all the participants to equate continuity of operations 
planning with overall emergency operations planning. 
Participants were queried as to “Where can continuity of operations planning 
documents and information be found?” This question elicited the following responses 
outlined in Table 6: 
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Table 6 
Location of Continuity of Operations Planning Documents and Information 
Participant Response 
B22 We don’t have a continuity of operations plan 
M23 We have three basic types 
T24 Part of the emergency preparedness manual 
DM25 Intertwined in the emergency management plan 
 
Participant M23 was asked to clarify his response. It was stated that there are 
three types of emergency operations plans at the institution to include a comprehensive 
plan, an abbreviated plan that is listed on the website, and a continuity of operations plan 
that was developed by a specific department for the care of laboratory animals. A review 
was made of the abbreviated plan from the institution’s website. It appears to be focused 
on emergency preparedness for the campus community and covers topics such as 
evacuations, shelter-in-place, active shooter survival, medical emergencies, terrorism, 
poisoning, hazardous material spills, severe weather, and demonstrations.  
Participant M23’s comprehensive emergency operations plan was developed for 
an ROTC unit at the institution and is not general in nature for the institution as a whole. 
The purpose of the plan states: 
“The purpose of this plan is to prepare the (name of institution) (military unit) to 
better respond to and recover from emergencies and disasters.” 
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The plan reflects guidance for addressing active shooters, bomb threats, 
suspicious behavior, demonstrations, fires, chemical spills, severe weather, and medical 
emergencies. The plan does not contain guidance on continuity of operations in terms of 
restoring operations to a state of normalcy. Hence, the abbreviated emergency 
preparedness plan and the comprehensive emergency preparedness plan are almost 
identical in covering the same areas. Yet, neither plan contains continuity of operations 
guidance. 
The third plan reviewed from participant M23 was developed by a research 
division of the institution and focuses on the care of laboratory animals. Even though it is 
more response focused than continuity focused, it does provide some guidance on 
relocating animals during and after a disaster, alternative feed sources if current feed is 
damaged from flooding, succession planning when it is unsafe for persons to travel to the 
campus to care for research animals (use of resident students), emergency lighting during 
a prolonged power outage, continuity of operations during civil disturbance involving 
animal rights groups, and mandatory supplies that must be kept on hand at all times. The 
supply list includes euthanasia supplies, carbon dioxide tank, water, bedding, animal 
food, and decontamination supplies. Most of the supplies must cover a 2-week period. 
The guide was issued in 2010 and revised January 2012. It was developed by individuals 
within the division. Even thought it does not follow generally accepted continuity of 
operations planning best practices, it is still a good grassroots attempt to have something 
in place for the care and housing of research animals. 
The emergency preparedness manual published online by participant T24 is 
comprehensive from a preparedness and response standpoint. As related by the 
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participant, continuity of operations planning is minimally a part of the plan and 
interspersed throughout. Reference is made to divisions being responsible for food 
service and academics during a pandemic. A team is identified in the plan that has the 
function of providing recovery care. Overall responsibility for meals during a disaster is 
placed on one specific individual. An appendix outlines supplies that are required by the 
campus community for sheltering-in-place in a residence facility and in an academic 
building. 
The emergency operations plan recently published by DM25 offers 
comprehensive guidance for responding to emergencies and disasters. There is also 
continuity of operations guidance throughout the document. Table 7 outlines some of the 
statements that are relevant to continuity of operations in the plan: 
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Table 7 
DM25 Guidance on Continuity of Operations 
Guidance Responsibility Area 
Restoration of general campus operations. Priority statement – no area of 
responsibility 
College will carry out disaster response and short-term 
recovery operations in conjunction with local resources. 
Assumption statement – no area of 
responsibility 
Develop plans to reschedule classes. Administration 
Implement proper back-up controls and redundancy to 
maintain critical services. 
Information Technology 
Maintain a records management plan that duplicates data on 
a regular basis and secures this information at a remote 
location. 
Information Technology 
Maintain a plan to perform critical applications at a remote 
site 
Information Technology 
Identify alternate facilities where college activities can be 
conducted 
Academic Affairs 
Prepare student center to be used as an alternate shelter 
during and after an emergency 
Student Affairs 
Maintain the continuity of payroll processing and critical 
employee benefit services 
Human Resources 
Maintain mail service operations Business Office 
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The statement made by DM25 to the effect that continuity of operations is 
intertwined in their emergency management plan is a true statement. This probably 
accounts for their misunderstanding of continuity of operations planning at the beginning 
of the interviews. They and the other participants seemed to view continuity of operations 
planning as being a part of emergency management planning as opposed to a separate 
planning function. If continuity of operations planning had been segregated into an annex 
in the emergency management plan, DM25 may have had a better understanding of the 
interview questions that were asked. DM25 has some level of understanding of continuity 
of operations planning by the mere fact that they were able to state where continuity of 
operations planning can be found.  
Of all of the participants, DM25 had the most comprehensive written plan that 
included continuity of operations. Tenets of continuity of operations planning in their 
plan include alternative facilities, vital records, communications, and reconstitution. 
More importantly, responsibilities are divided into several areas of the institution which 
is indicative of a team approach to continuity of operations planning. 
The theme that developed from the three participants who have emergency 
operations plans is that continuity of operations is integrated into the plan but not as a 
separate subset or a separate plan with more intense focus and step-by-step guidance 
based upon FEMA training and FEMA guidelines. Even though it is desirable for 
continuity of operations to be a separate plan due to the significant need for HBCU’s to 
be able to expeditiously recover from a disaster, having continuity of operations planning 
in the general emergency operations manual is a step in the right direction and an 
indication of forward thinking. 
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The following two interview questions are similar: 
“Who is the person tasked with continuity of operations planning and how is 
 planning accomplished?” 
“What responsibilities do departments have for continuity of operations 
 planning?”  
For the first question concerning the identity of the person who is responsible for 
continuity of operations planning, the responses included the president and executive 
cabinet, vice president for student affairs, administrative team, emergency management 
coordinator, and a disaster team. There was no general consensus on the second question 
involving the responsibilities departments have for continuity of operations planning. The 
common theme from the responses received to the first question is that the responsibility 
for continuity of operations planning is generally shared either at the executive level or 
accomplished through a team or committee. The team concept is ideal for buy-in across 
the institution. Furthermore, an individual will not have expertise in all facets of an 
institution. For example, the person in charge of Housing may not be adept at the 
workings of the Information Technology department. The Payroll department head may 
not be well-versed in Food Service operations. Plan development at the executive level 
demonstrates the importance leadership places on continuity of operations planning. 
Continuity of operations planning can involve change, and change is best implemented at 
the highest level of an organization (Burke, 2011). 
The question was asked: “What will be the institution’s response to a pandemic 
that will require student isolation or quarantining, and how will students be taught, fed, 
and cared for?” The purpose of this question was to solicit a response on how well the 
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study participants have planned for several aspects of continuity of operations inclusive 
of housing, food service, isolation of students, and academic studies. Two of the 
participants do not have housing or food service on campus. One of the participants 
stated that such a situation would have little impact for them since they are a commuter 
school. The other institution that has no housing or food service advised that students at 
the affected school would be relocated to one of their other campuses. The two 
participants with housing had two differing responses. One participant stated they would 
close the school, isolate the students, and then allow the health department to take the 
lead. The other participant did not indicate the type of action would be taken other than to 
offer it would be a “triage-type situation” and they would handle the situation as best they 
can. No general themes developed from the participant responses. One will close down, 
another will transfer students, a third participant will “play it by ear,” and yet another 
feels that the impact will be minimal. 
Participants were asked about plans for caring for laboratory animals during and 
after a disaster. Only participant M23 has ongoing research involving laboratory animals 
and specimens. As outlined earlier, the area responsible for research at this participant’s 
institution has developed a continuity of operations plan. 
Several interesting responses developed when participants were queried about 
requirements for contractors such as food service providers to have a continuity of 
operations plan in place as part of their contractual agreement with the institution. B22 
stated they do not have contracted food service, and that the campus community would 
have to “eat off the local economy.” The respondent further clarified “eat off the local 
economy” to mean that restaurants and fast food establishments are located in close 
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proximity to the school. This respondent further stated that they could use the facilities of 
a larger university close to their campus if food service is needed. Food services at T24 is 
contracted, however, there is no requirement in the contract for the food service vendor to 
have a continuity of operations plan for quickly resuming and maintaining their services 
during and after a disaster. Participant M23 has an agreement with a local elementary 
school to provide food services in the event of a disaster. The food service contractor for 
M23 had to transfer all meal preparations off-site approximately 3-years ago to the 
elementary school when a structural defect threatened the safety of the building on 
campus where food service was being provided. The food service contractor also has an 
agreement with its parent company to quickly resume operations. DM25 does not have 
food service on its campuses. The theme that emerged from responses to this question is 
that the commuter schools and a smaller university either had no provisions in place for 
food service during and after a disaster or the campus community had to fend for 
themselves by obtaining food service from the local economy. Conversely, the larger 
institution, participant M23, has a plan in place for alternative facilities for food 
preparation, and this plan was put into action approximately 3-years ago. 
The question, “What disruptions in the educational process have occurred within 
the past seven years” was asked to gain an understanding of the disruptions that have 
negatively impacted participants and how participants have responded to the disruptions. 
Participant B22 had to close for more than a week due to a severe weather event that cut 
off electrical power to the area. The campus did not have back-up generators at the time. 
As a result, servers could not be used to send updates to keep the campus community 
informed of the situation and the progress being made to continue the education process. 
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Participant DM25 had two severe weather events occur at the same time that were 
distinctly different. The institution closed for several days. DM25 used its emergency 
notification system to send text messages and telephone messages to the campus 
community on a daily basis to keep them abreast of the situation and whether classes 
were going to be held. DM25 cites their emergency notification system as being key in 
their response to the disaster. Participant T24 has not experienced a disaster within the 
past 7-years. It was mentioned that a severe weather pattern came within one mile of their 
campus, but there was no impact. This is the same weather pattern that negatively 
impacted participant B22. According to participant T24, two students were killed who 
resided off-campus. T24 theorized that if they had to close campus for several days, they 
would most likely teach classes online or use a local church or K-12 school. These plans 
have been discussed although they have not been committed to written form. The only 
disruptions that have been experienced by participant M23 are weekend power outages. 
According to M23, these disruptions have had minor impact on the institution. There was 
no general theme that developed from this inquiry. Only two participants – both 
commuter institutions have experienced a disruption. One was prepared and the other was 
not. Of the two participants that have not experienced a disruption, one theorized on how 
they would respond, and the other participant had only experienced weekend power 
outages that had little impact on the institution. 
Two questions were asked regarding administrative support and local emergency 
management agency support for continuity of operations plans development. Participants 
made the following comments about administrative support at their institutions for 
continuity of operations planning: 
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“She (president) is very supportive.” 
“Most definitely” 
“…an open cash register or cash drawer.” 
Participant DM25 was not asked this question because both individuals 
interviewed at the participant institution are administrators. The following comments 
were made concerning support offered by local emergency management agencies: 
“We have a great partnership” 
“… constant information from the EMA (emergency management agency)” 
“I’ve got direct lines with them.” 
“In the process of trying to put a plan together, they were very helpful.” 
“Gave us good feedback.” 
“Partnership and relationship is solid.” 
“Able to partnership with emergency management people.” 
“They help with the writing of plans.” 
The theme that developed from these questions is that administrative and local 
emergency manage support is very strong for overall emergency operations planning. 
Administration insures that there is participation for the planning and time allotted from 
normal operations to engage in the planning process. The local emergency management 
agency, at the county level, offers technical assistance for planning. 
The final question was asked: “What can be done to strengthen continuity of 
operations planning at your institution in terms of training, financial resources, 
equipment, and overall institution support?” Participant B22 related that new technology 
such as the software program Maxient would strengthen overall public safety and 
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emergency operations planning. It was further stated that being able to communicate in 
real-time with the local emergency management agency would be of benefit to activating 
a continuity of operations plan.  
Participant T24 responded that there are two issues standing in the way of 
effective continuity of operations planning at the institution. The first issue has to do with 
finding the time to take on this task in consideration of all of his other responsibilities 
inclusive of crime fighting, crime prevention, federal compliance, overall emergency 
operations planning, and day-to-day incidents and emergencies that have to be addressed. 
The second issue is related to the topic itself being placed on the back burner if it were to 
be brought up at a meeting. This issue seemed to speak to a lack of administrative 
support. According to T24, there are so many other matters that are pressing that 
something like continuity of operations planning would probably not be a priority. 
Participant M24 indicated that having to deal with normal operations involving 
criminal activity and other responsibilities is definitely an impediment to engaging in 
continuity of operations planning. This participant further offered that lack of equipment 
for implementing a continuity of operations plan for the overall campus is a problem. It 
should be noted that this participant has a continuity of operations plan that was 
developed and published by the division responsible for the care of research animals. 
Response to this question was focused on a general continuity of operations plan for the 
institution. 
Participant DM25 identified several hindrances to having an effective continuity 
of operations plan. The first deals with personnel. It is felt that a dedicated person is 
needed to attend to all emergency operations planning and response activities. Currently, 
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one of the administrators, who is part of the two person team who responded on behalf of 
the institution, is responsible for emergency operations planning. She offered that she has 
to do safety inspections at all their campuses; initiate, plan, and lead out in exercises at 
the campuses; and develop disaster response plans. The respondent felt that with all of 
her other administrative duties, she is not able to effectively do continuity of operations 
planning other than to integrate such planning in their overall emergency operations plan. 
Having a dedicated person for this initiative would be advantageous, according to the 
respondent. The other administrative respondent for participant DM25 stated that training 
is a factor that negatively impacts their continuity of operations planning and response. 
According to this respondent, emergency operations training seldom flows down to 
security officers.  
The theme that developed from the responses to this final interview question is 
that there are impediments to effective continuity of operations planning that center 
around lack of resources, the need for training, and time to devote to planning. Dedicated 
persons who have adequate time and professional training are needed to spearhead the 
planning function with administrative support in terms of establishing this training as a 
priority. 
Summary of Interview Responses 
Responses to initial questions relevant to understanding the concept of continuity 
of operations planning indicated that half of the respondents at the participant institutions 
had at least a rudimentary understanding. However, when emergency operations plans 
were reviewed, one of the respondents who did not appear to have an understanding of 
continuity of operations planning had the most continuity of operations tenets in their 
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emergency operations plan. Hence, three out of the four respondents either have 
knowledge of continuity of operations principles or have continuity of operations 
principles in their emergency operations plan. 
Only two of the respondents had conducted continuity of operations planning – 
the participant that has a continuity of operations plan developed by a research division, 
and the participant that has extensive continuity of operations planning in its overall 
emergency operations plan. 
In terms of overall emergency operations planning to include continuity of 
operations planning, the team approach was the generally accepted protocol. The teams 
included executive level involvement and support. 
There was a general understanding by all respondents from the participant 
institutions that some form of response would be needed to resume or maintain 
operations during a critical incident. One participant had been discussing using 
alternative facilities such as churches, schools, or community centers to hold classes. 
Another participant had an actual disruption that necessitated transferring academic 
functions to another campus. A third participant had to use alternative food services 
during a disruption. 
There appears to be executive support for overall emergency operations planning 
at the participant institutions, and support from the local emergency management agency.  
Impediments to effective continuity of operations planning at the participant 
institutions appear to be lack of resources, lack of training, and time constraints due to 
other responsibilities and commitments. 
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Review of Government & Industry Guidance on COOP 
A review of government and industry guidance relating to continuity of 
operations planning in general was conducted for purposes of triangulation to establish a 
baseline, if possible, for what constitutes continuity of operations planning at institutions 
of higher education. The principal documents reviewed were Continuity Guidance 
Circular 1 (FEMA, 2013); Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations 
Plans for Institutions of Higher Education (U.S. Department of Education, 2013); 
Business Continuity Guideline: A Practical Approach for Emergency Preparedness, 
Crisis Management, and Disaster Recovery (ASIS, 2005); and Standard on 
Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (NFPA, 2013). 
Continuity Guidance Circular 1 
Continuity Guidance Circular 1(CGC1) is the overarching guidance on continuity 
of operations planning for non-federal government agencies with adaptation and utility 
for the private sector and non-government organizations. This is the principal resource 
that will be used for determining what should be involved in continuity of operations 
planning for an academic setting, matters to be considered relevant to higher education, 
the critical components of a plan, and testing of the plan. Each of the other documents 
mentioned will be reviewed for the minimal guidance they offer. In the end, a model of 
the planning process will develop that will be used to determine the extent of continuity 
of operations planning by the study participants based upon their responses to the 
interview questions and their written plans that were reviewed.  
CGC1 outlines a philosophy that organizations should build redundancy and 
resiliency into their operations as a standard to insure that the organization can carry 
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forward its mission essential and supportive functions during and after disastrous 
situations that may include acts of nature, catastrophic accidents, technological 
emergencies, and acts of terrorism (FEMA, 2013). The CGC1 (FEMA, 2013) designates 
the following pillars that are the mainstay for an organization being able to perform its 
essential functions and thereby build continuity capability and resiliency: 
Leadership and Staff – For continuity of the performance of essential functions 
within an organization, there has to be continuity of leadership. Clear lines of succession 
and delegation of authority must be planned for and present at the onset of an emergency 
incident in the event existing leadership is absent. The leadership gives reassurance, 
manages the crisis, and keeps the focus in sync with functions that must be performed. 
Effective leadership continuity involves cross-training with both peers and subordinates 
on the performance of essential functions that are expected during a crisis situation. 
Leaders must understand their role and the process of implementing continuity of 
operations plans. 
Communication – A means of communicating during a crisis using all avenues 
available is critical for performing essential functions. Interoperability is an important 
aspect of technology use so that functions inherent in continuity of operations 
implementation can remain seamless. The use of voice, data, and video should mirror 
day-to-day operations during a crisis. 
Facilities – During a crisis, the performance of essential functions may need to 
occur at alternative facilities. This may be inclusive of a building, tent, or even the hood 
of a vehicle. The goal is to have an adequate base operation that can be used in the event 
there is a problem functioning from current locations. 
86 
 
CGC1 delineates the following elements of sound continuity of operations 
planning for continuity capability (FEMA, 2013): 
Essential Functions - Identifying and setting priorities establishes parameters 
that lay the foundation for continuity of operations planning and response. There are 
several categories of essential functions that range from national essential functions 
geared towards federal continuity of operations planning to essential supporting functions 
that are ancillary and do not rise to a high level of urgency. In the middle are mission 
essential functions which are broad in nature and must continue or quickly resume for the 
sustainability of an organization. Mission essential functions have broader application to 
private industry, state and local governments, and non-profit organizations. 
Orders of Succession – Key leadership positions must have predetermined 
alternates in the event leadership is unavailable or incapacitated. 
Delegation of Authority – During a critical incident, the legal authority of 
leadership to make decisions at all levels must be clearly defined. This should be 
predetermined and disseminated throughout the organization. This predetermined 
delegation of authority will normally be put into place “when normal channels of 
direction and control are disrupted.” 
Continuity Facilities – This term refers to “alternate sites” and “devolution 
sites.” Alternate sites are locations other than primary locations where essential functions 
are normally performed. Devolution sites are locations that are geographically separated 
from the primary site where all operations will take place.  
Continuity Communications – During a critical situation, an organization must 
maintain a communication system through redundancy or alternative means that will 
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continue information technology functions; and voice, print, and electronic 
communications for connectivity with government agencies, employees, stakeholders, 
and the general public as appropriate. 
Essential Records Management – Records needed for the performance of 
essential functions must be readily available at primary operation locations during a 
critical incident, and at alternate locations when primary operation locations are disabled 
or otherwise unusable. Such records may include hardcopies of documents, software, and 
data records contained on information technology systems. 
Human Resources – When a continuity plan is activated, organizations must 
have provisions in place for addressing the needs of workers in the workplace, and for 
having additional human resources available to augment the current workforce. Telework 
provisions should also be a consideration with policies in place that govern working from 
remote locations in terms of expectations, procedures, and instructions. 
Test, Training and Exercise (TT&E) Program – A TT&E program will 
validate that everyone has been trained on the plan, and through exercises and drills, the 
viability of the plan will be affirmed. Training will familiarize everyone with the plan and 
offer guidance on the various roles individuals will play when the plan is activated. 
Exercises and drills will validate “the organization’s continuity capabilities” in the 
performance of essential functions during and after a critical incident. Deficiencies noted 
during exercises and drills will facilitate a plan of improvement that will guide a revision 
of the plan. 
Devolution of Control and Direction – This process involves planning for the 
complete transfer of the performance of essential functions to another geographic 
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location when the primary site, staff, and equipment are incapable of sustaining the 
performance of these functions. Authority to perform essential functions are delegated in 
total to the new site which may be a related organization or department, or an unrelated 
entity. 
Reconstitution of Operations – Reconstitution is the process of resuming normal 
operations at the original facilities by surviving or replacement personnel. It is sometimes 
a process of establishing a “new norm” with replacement facilities, additional personnel, 
and a modified or replaced infrastructure as relates to communications, information 
technology and essential records. Reconstitution reflects the ability of an organization to 
fully recover from a critical incident and resume normal operations. 
CGC1 offers guidance on how continuity of operations planning should take place 
in an organization from an organizational standpoint. Table 8 offers some organizational 
considerations from the CGC1 (FEMA, 2013): 
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Table 8 
Organizational Considerations  
Consideration Explanation 
Develop and document a continuity plan 
and its supporting procedures. 
The plan and procedures should provide for the 
continued performance of essential functions 
under all circumstances. 
The organizational head should approve and 
sign the plan to include significant updates and 
addendums. 
Such as an administrator, president, Director 
Review the plan annually. Document dates of review and changes. 
Incorporate continuity requirements into daily 
operations. 
Insures seamless and immediate continuations 
of essential functions. 
Annual certification by divisions and 
departments within an organization that they 
have a current plan. 
 
Annual certification that the plan has been 
tested through an exercise. 
Exercise should involve movement to an 
alternate site that has been preplanned. 
 
CGC1 (FEMA, 2013) also offers guidance on how the planning process should 
take place within an organization from a planning perspective. Table 9 outlines some 
pertinent planning considerations: 
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Table 9 
Planning Considerations for Continuity of Operations Planning 
Consideration Explanation 
Address the key elements of continuity Essential functions, orders of succession, 
delegation of authority, continuity facilities, 
continuity of communications, essential 
records, human resources, TT&E, devolution, 
and reconstitution 
Address the four phases of continuity Readiness & Preparedness; Activation; 
Continuity Operations; and Reconstitution 
Provide a process for determining the 
organization’s readiness posture. 
Provide a process that insures plan activation. 
Include a decision matrix 
Establish and maintain relocation, devolution, 
and transition of responsibility procedures. 
Identify the process for implementation of the 
continuity plan within a minimum timeframe. 
Includes challenges imposed by extenuating 
circumstances. 
Insure operations can be sustained for up to 30 
days. 
Includes challenges imposed by extended 
events. 
 
Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs 
The 2013 edition of the Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and 
Business Continuity Programs published by the National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA, 2013), commonly referred to as NFPA Standard 1600, and herein referred to as 
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NFPA 1600, has continuity of operations planning guidance comingled throughout the 
document with emergency management planning concepts. The NFPA 1600 has many of 
the concepts as outlined in the CGC1 document. Some of the key concepts offered in the 
NFPA 1600 are condensed or abbreviated and listed as follows (NFPA, 2013): 
 Identification of records (hard copy or electronic) vital to continue the 
operations of the entity. 
 Implementation of procedures to store, retrieve, and recover records onsite or 
offsite. 
 Designating lines of authority. 
 Designating lines of succession and delegation of authority 
 Conducting exercises to identify planning/procedural deficiencies, and to test 
and validate the plan and changes to the plan. 
 Identification of essential and critical functions 
 Logistical support and procedural requirements 
 Plan should include recovery strategies to maintain critical time-sensitive  
functions and processes. 
 The plan should identify stakeholders who need to be notified; alternative 
work sites; vital records; contact lists; functions and processes that must be 
maintained; and personnel, procedures, and resources that are needed while 
the entity is recovering. 
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Business Continuity Guideline 
The Business Continuity Guideline published by ASIS International (ASIS, 2005), 
and billed as “A Practical Approach for Emergency Preparedness, Crisis Management, 
and Disaster Recovery” provides continuity of operations planning guidance that is 
focused more towards Business Continuity Planning (BCP) as opposed to continuity of 
operations planning. ASIS (2005) states the BCP is a planning process that is often used 
by businesses – especially manufacturing and production establishments. Consideration is 
given to purchasing, supply chain, sales, distribution channels, accounts receivables, 
accounts payables, payroll, information technology, and research and development 
(ASIS, 2005). However, several concepts that can be applied to basic continuity of 
operations planning were reviewed. These concepts are summarized as follows: 
 Senior leadership in the organization should take responsibility for the 
business continuity plan. 
 A determination should be made on how long essential functions can be 
delayed before impact becomes unacceptable. 
 There may be different recovery mandates based upon the time of year. 
 Compliance audits should be conducted to enforce business continuity 
planning. 
 Alternate worksites should be designated 
 Transportation of workers, supplies, and critical data to alternative worksites 
is important. 
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 Agreements should be reached with vendors and service providers before a 
critical incident occurs. 
 Where appropriate, the business continuity plans of vendors and service 
providers should be reviewed to gauge their capability to maintain or resume 
operations. 
 The business continuity plan should seek to bring the company back to normal 
operations or the “new norm” if normal operations are no longer possible. 
 The business continuity plan should be tested through drills and exercises. 
 Based upon the results of drills and exercises, the business continuity plan 
should be modified if such is warranted. 
Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of 
Higher Education 
The Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for 
Institutions of Higher Education (The Guide), as published in 2013 and developed by the 
Department of Education and several other federal agencies, is the most recent 
publication on emergency management planning directed at the higher education 
community (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). This document is wholly deficient in 
continuity of operations planning with a greater emphasis being placed on nonsensical 
matters that appear to be unrelated to overall emergency management. For example, even 
though continuity of operations planning guidance is dispersed throughout the document, 
less than a half page of guidance is given specifically dealing with continuity of 
operations planning which is recommended be relegated to an annex in an overall 
emergency operations plan (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). Conversely, six pages 
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are devoted to crime reporting and other aspects of the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of 
Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act); 17 pages are 
devoted to information sharing requirements of the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA); and two pages are devoted to privacy issues related to the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2013). In the paragraph that recommends having a COOP Annex, reference is 
made to a “Resource Section” where further information on continuity of operations 
planning can be found for institutions of higher education. However, there is no Resource 
section anywhere in the document or further instructions on where additional resources 
on continuity of operations planning can be found for institutions of higher education. 
The main take-away from the U.S. Department of Education (2013) guideline is the 
process for emergency operations planning which is directly applicable to continuity of 
operations planning. The U.S. Department of Education (2013) delineates continuity of 
operations concepts such as forming a collaborative team for planning, determining goals 
and objectives, overall plan development, plan review and approval, and plan 
implementation and maintenance delineated. This step-by-step planning process is further 
delineated in Table 10 (2013): 
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Table 10 
Steps For Plan Development  
Steps Description 
1. Form a team Small but representative of campus community 
2. Understand situation Identify threats and hazards and assess the risks posed 
3. Goals & objectives Develop three goals for each threat or hazard 
Develop objectives to meet the goals 
4. Plan development Develop courses of actions, assign responsibilities 
5. Plan preparation, review, and 
approval 
Format, write, approve, and share the plan 
6. Plan implementation & 
maintenance 
Train campus community, publish and distribute to key 
stakeholders, test the plan through exercises and drills. 
Review, revise, and maintain the plan. 
 
In addition to guidance on the planning process, the U.S. Department of 
Education (2013) offers the following guidance on general continuity of operations 
planning for institutions of higher education that I have summarized: 
 Identify alternative facilities where institution operations can take place if 
primary facilities are unusable or inaccessible. 
 Develop a business continuity plan for the Business office 
 Develop a Continuity of Operations annex  
 Develop individual plans to maintain payroll, human resource, and teaching 
functions. 
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 Develop procedures for temporary housing for residential students 
 The plan should account for plan activation for up to 30 days; safety and 
security; basic services such as food and housing, financial aid, instruction; 
and devolution. 
Summary of Review of Government & Industry Guidance on COOP 
The purpose for reviewing the government and industry guidelines on continuity 
of operations planning and implementation was to establish a baseline for determining 
what constitutes effective continuity of operations planning at institutions of higher 
education. As a form of triangulation and to guard against bias on my part in injecting my 
feelings on what constitutes effective continuity of operations planning, a model planning 
process would be used for this determination. The model that developed from my review 
of government and industry guidelines and from my personal experience and training is 
outlined as follows in order of importance (FEMA, 2013; U.S. Department of Education, 
2013; ASIS, 2005; NFPA, 2013): 
1. The overall goal of continuity of operations planning for an institution of 
higher education should be to build redundancy and resiliency into normal 
operations for the continuation of mission essential and supportive functions. 
2. Support for the planning process must be at the highest level of the institution 
which may include the board of trustees, president, provost, and vice 
presidents. 
3. A planning committee should be formed that is small, yet representative of the 
critical facets of the institution. A leader or coordinator should be designated. 
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4. A Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) should be 
conducted to determine the kinds of incidents that may negatively impact the 
institution. Such an assessment will guide the identification of mission 
essential functions and the development of mitigation strategies. 
5. The planning committee should work towards developing an overall 
continuity of operations plan for the institution, and assist divisions and 
departments in developing plans that are specific to their functions and 
responsibilities. 
6. The planning committee should identify three to four mission essential 
functions for the institution. Depending upon the institution as relates to focus, 
size, public versus private, etc., the mission essential functions may include 
any of the following: 
a. Instruction 
b. Research (grant funded studies, laboratory animals/specimens) 
c. Major sporting events that generate substantial revenue and media 
attention (e.g. Alabama vs. Auburn football game) 
d. Residential life (on-campus housing and food service)  
e. Hospital and auxiliary facilities (clinics, dialysis, labs) 
f. Campus safety and security 
g. Museums and archives 
7. Supportive essential functions should also be identified which may include the 
following: 
a. Financial aid (scholarship awards, student loans, refund disbursements) 
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b. Regulatory reporting (Jeanne Clery Act, Title IX, Title IV) 
c. Payroll & Human Resource functions 
d. Enrollment management (student recruitment, campus visits) 
e. Information technology 
f. Vital records (Registrar’s office, clinic medical records, HR records) 
g. Facilities (custodial, maintenance,  air conditioning/ heating, 
transportation, grounds) 
h. Accounting (receivables, payables, research accounting, contracts, vendor 
management) 
8. Plans must be in place for the institution’s order of succession and delegation 
of authority 
9. Identify continuity facilities (online instruction; use of K-12 schools, 
churches, community centers, and malls for classroom and lab instruction; 
alternative facilities on campus for offices, food service, and housing) 
10. Plan for transportation of individuals, records, and equipment to continuity 
facilities. 
11. Plan for continuity of communications, and storage and retrieval of vital 
records 
12. The planning committee should outline how devolution, if necessary, will take 
place for all institution functions or for specific functions  
13. The process of reconstitution should be outlined in terms of who institutes this 
process and how it is carried forward 
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14. A decision matrix is needed that specifies who activates the continuity of 
operations plan, and requirements for implementing the plan within a 
minimum timeframe 
15. A plan for training employees, in-house vendors/contractors, and external 
stakeholders on the continuity of operations plan is needed. 
16. Testing of the plan through exercises and drills, and a plan review schedule 
must be included in the continuity of operations plan 
17. The plan must be approved and signed-off by the institution’s leadership. 
18. The plan should be distributed internally and externally as appropriate 
Once the overall plan is developed for the institution, the planning committee 
should embark upon a campaign to assist divisions, departments, and functional units in 
the development of their continuity of operations plans. All the components of the overall 
plan will generally apply.  
Summary of Government and Industry Guidelines 
By far, Continuity Guidance Circular 1 (FEMA, 2013) offered the most guidance 
for developing continuity of operations plans for institutions of higher education. The 
Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of 
Higher Education (U.S. Department of Education, 2013) offers some guidance on 
continuity of operations planning and brings Continuity Guidance Circular 1 into context 
for continuity of operations planning at an institution of higher education. The documents 
Business Continuity Guideline: A Practical Approach for Emergency Preparedness, 
Crisis Management, and Disaster Recovery (ASIS, 2005); and Standard on 
Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (NFPA, 2013) both 
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provide some of the same guidance that is contained in Continuity Guidance Circular 1 
(FEMA, 2013) and Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for 
Institutions of Higher Education (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). 
Summary 
The responses to the interview questions by respondents at the participant 
institutions developed themes relevant to continuity of operations training and 
understanding, implementation, and impediments that pose a hindrance to planning. From 
a review of government and industry guidelines emerged a model guideline for continuity 
of operations planning at institutions of higher education.  
The research questions were directly linked to the topic of this study which sought 
to understand the extent of continuity of operations planning at Historically Black 
Universities and Colleges in the State of Alabama. The review of government and 
industry guidelines provided a baseline for examining where the participant institutions 
stand in continuity of operations planning. The data analysis and findings indicate that 
continuity of operations planning is lacking and there are impediments to effective 
planning. 
Chapter 5 will provide further interpretation of the findings in the context of the 
theoretical framework. Furthermore, conclusions, limitations, recommendations, and 
implications for positive social change will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
This study was initiated for the primary purpose of exploring the extent of 
planning conducted by HBCUs in a specific state to sustain or quickly resume the 
education process and supportive functions during and after a disaster. This process is 
known as continuity of operations planning or academic continuity. A purposeful sample 
of HBCUs in Alabama was chosen due to the following criteria:  
 Having the highest number of HBCUs in the nation. 
 The susceptibility of Alabama to severe weather and manmade hazards  
 My familiarity with HBCUs in Alabama as a result of my working at one 
of the institutions as a Director of Public Safety. 
From a review of the limited literature on continuity of operations planning in 
higher education, it became apparent that a focus in this area of emergency preparedness 
is lacking. The sole emergency management planning guideline from a federal 
government agency directed at institutions of higher education was found to be heavy on 
overall emergency preparedness from a planning and response mode, but light on 
guidance for continuity of operations planning and preparedness (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2013).  
The absence of substantial literature and guidance pertaining to continuity of 
operations planning for institutions of higher education can leave HBCUs unprepared. 
Many HBCUs are experiencing an uncertain future due to negative publicity, low 
graduation rates, fiscal instability, miniscule endowments, and allegations of poor 
leadership (Association for the Study of Higher Education, 2010; Drezner & Gupta, 
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2012; Gasman & Bowman, 2011; Hobson, 2012). However, in spite of these negative 
issues, HCBUs have built a legacy of educating African Americans, some of whom 
would do not meet the academic standards to gain admission to predominantly white 
institutions (Brown, 2013). HBCUs have graduated the majority of African American 
Ph.D.’s, Army officers, federal judges, and physicians (Nichols, 2004). Furthermore, they 
have graduated almost half of all African American teachers, computer scientists, and 
engineers (Nichols, 2004). For many African Americans, HBCUs are the gateway to 
maturing intellectually (Davis, 2013). 
These institutions must remain viable for the academic opportunities they offer to 
African Americans and others in society. This underscores the importance of HBCUs 
having continuity of operations plans in place to increase resiliency in the event of a 
disaster. 
A secondary purpose for this study was to explore any impediments that might 
hinder effective continuity of operations planning. It had been my experience working at 
an HBCU that the person responsible for the policing, security, or safety of the campus 
was also responsible for spearheading overall emergency operations planning. This 
person usually holds the title of Director of Public Safety, Director of Security, Chief of 
Campus Police, or a similar title. In my former capacity as a board member of the 
HBCU-LEEA; and as the former head of the Campus Resiliency Committee for the 
HBCU Emergency Management Consortium, I had constant contact with these 
individuals. I became keenly aware of the challenges they were facing in taking on the 
added responsibility of emergency operations planning. Most of my peers were 
functioning with limited staffing while being consumed with combating crime on and 
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near their campuses. Their training and experience in emergency management, with the 
exception of active shooter response, was often lacking. Administrative and financial 
support for purchasing equipment, upgrading facilities, and for attending training and 
conferences was sometimes less than adequate.  
Finally, it was my thought that bringing to the forefront the deficiency in 
continuity of operations guidance focused towards institutions of higher education in 
general might generate interest at the federal level to place guidance in this area as a high 
priority. 
Key Research Findings 
The interview questions that were presented to respondents from the participant 
institutions were designed to solicit the following information. 
 Knowledge relevant to the concept and tenets of continuity of operations 
planning 
 Whether formal or informal continuity of operations planning has been, or is 
currently taking place 
 Practical experience in implementing continuity of operations principles 
during and after an actual disaster.  
 Support and impediments to effective continuity of operations planning. 
In response to the first item, most of the respondents did not have a solid grasp of 
continuity of operations planning in a formal sense in terms of terminology, principles, 
step-by-step planning sequence, implementation, and other factors. However, the 
respondents did have an informal perspective on continuity of operations planning. This 
was from (a) having implemented essential functions during an actual disaster, (b) having 
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continuity of operations guidelines interspersed throughout their emergency operations 
plan, (c) having knowledge a continuity of operations plan at their institution, or (d) 
having informal discussions with administrators regarding disaster plans.  
Some of the respondents have formal continuity of operations plans in place as 
stand-alone documents or as part of their emergency operations plans. Other respondents 
have had discussions on how they will respond to a major disruption in operations. At 
least two of the respondents had responded to incidents where alternative facilities and 
services were utilized.  
In response to the final item, overall support for emergency management planning 
appears to be strong internally at the administration level and externally through local 
county emergency management agencies. The primary impediment to effective planning 
appears to be lack of time, lack of training, and lack of resources.  
A review of government and industry guidance on continuity of operations 
planning specifically geared towards institutions of higher education was found to be 
inadequate. The review was conducted with the hope of establishing a model for 
continuity of operations planning in the setting of an institution of higher education. It 
was my intention to compare the model with the planning that had taken place at the 
participant institutions to assess whether their planning had been consistent with a 
recognized standard. Instead, I was tasked with developing a model using Continuity 
Guidance Circular I (FEMA, 2013) as my primary resource with supportive information 
gleaned from the Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for 
Institutions of Higher Education (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). 
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Interpretations of the Findings 
The interpretations of the findings of this study are guided by the following two 
central research questions: 
RQ1 What is the extent of continuity of operations planning at HBCUs in the State of 
Alabama? 
RQ2 What can be done to strengthen continuity of operations planning at these 
institutions? 
In comparison to the continuity of operations planning model that was developed, 
the study participants did not compare well in their continuity of operations planning 
efforts. This may be attributable to two factors: a lack of training and the absence of 
comprehensive guidance in continuity of operations planning for higher education. None 
of the respondents at the participant institutions had taken any of the continuity of 
operations planning courses offered by FEMA identified in Table 4. Furthermore, there is 
no specific systematic guidance available from the Department of Education or any other 
federal agency on continuity of operations planning focused towards institutions of 
higher education (FEMA, 2013; U.S. Department of Education, 2013). The lack of 
comprehensive government guidance in continuity of operations planning specific to 
higher education was outlined in the Chapter 2 literature review. The literature review 
brings to the forefront that general guidance for nongovernment entities is provided in 
Continuity Guidance Circular 1 (FEMA, 2013), and minimal continuity of operations 
planning guidance is contained in the Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency 
Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher Education (U.S. Department of Education, 
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2013). What is wholly absent is a guideline that offers a model approach to continuity of 
operations planning in the higher education arena.  
Hence, the lack of comprehensive continuity of operations planning by the study 
participants may result in their inability to perform mission essential functions during and 
after a disaster. This adds to the tenuous existence of the participant institutions as 
outlined in the Chapter 2 literature review. HBCUs are plagued with a host of problems 
that threaten their existence (Association for the Study of Higher Education, 2010; 
Drezner & Gupta, 2012; Gasman & Bowman, 2011; Hobson, 2012). In addition, since the 
participant institutions are located in a gulf coast state, they are susceptible to severe 
weather related incidents (Beggan, 2011; Stein Vickio, Fogo & Abraham, 2007) as 
outlined in the Chapter 2 literature review.  
In terms of what can be done to strengthen continuity of operations planning at 
the study participant institutions, the findings reflect that more time is needed for 
planning. There is a lack of equipment and resources so planning needs to be a priority. A 
dedicated person is needed to spearhead the planning and training is needed in continuity 
of operations planning. This finding indicates that the study participants are strapped for 
resources, training, and equipment; and they are multitasking to the point of not being 
able to position continuity of operations planning as a priority. Simply stated, individuals 
responsible for leading out in the planning effort are being hindered by other 
responsibilities that take priority, unavailable resources, and little if any training. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this study is the resiliency theory that has its 
origins in physics and is based upon the ideology of objects having the ability to rebound 
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or bounce back from distress (Plough et al., 2013). In the behavioral science realm, the 
term resiliency is identified with communities and individuals and their capacity to adapt 
to adverse conditions (Plough et al., 2013). Resiliency theory has evolved to encompass 
concerns for communities and individuals to be able to sustain themselves or quickly 
recover when faced with adversity (Plough et al., 2013; Norris et al., 2008; Longstaff et 
al., 2010). 
Resiliency theory has a direct connection to continuity of operations planning in 
terms of communities rebounding from a disaster to sustain or quickly resume the 
performance of essential functions (Longstaff et al., 2010). In consideration that 
institutions of higher education are communities, their resiliency is directly related to 
effective continuity of operations planning.  
The findings of the study reflected that the respondents at the participant 
institutions are resilient even in the absence of formalized continuity of operations plans 
and planning efforts. They have recovered from critical incidents at their institutions that 
have necessitated the use of alternative facilities and alternative services to sustain key 
essential functions. Finally, the respondents, in the absence of formalized plans, 
conceptualized verbally how they will respond to disasters. This is an indication of their 
resiliency.  
Limitations of the Study 
In Chapter 1, I stated that continuity of operations planning in an academic setting 
has not been adequately researched for the development of a continuity of operations 
planning model to be used as a baseline to gauge the planning that had been done by 
study participants. It became necessary for me to develop such a model from government 
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guidelines and my personal experience. It is possible that the model I developed will not 
be applicable to all HBCUs and institutions of higher education in general. Scalability 
may be an issue since institutions of higher education vary and they may have various 
levels of athletic programs, professional schools, and commercial establishments. Hence, 
one size may not fit all. 
I selected HBCUs in Alabama for this study because the state has the highest 
number of HBCUs in the nation (Brown, 2013). Alabama was also an ideal location for 
my study due to the number of hazards and threats that are present in the state inclusive 
of large urban populations with the potential for criminal activities, military bases, 
nuclear plants, and exposure to severe weather. The study participants may represent a 
worst-case scenario in comparison to HBCUs in other states where there are less threats 
and hazards. Hence, continuity of operations planning may not be as critical in these 
states. 
Recommendations 
Individuals and committees charged with emergency operations planning at 
HBCUs must receive training and guidance in continuity of operations planning to build 
adaptive capacity which will foster resiliency during and after a disaster that negatively 
impacts the institution. Thus, based upon the findings of this study, the following 
recommendations are being made, some of which mirror the recommendations made 
earlier by a 2007 working group (University of Maryland, 2007): 
 A federal agency, preferably the U.S. Department of Education, needs to 
revise the Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans 
for Institutions of Higher Education (FEMA, 2013) and include 
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comprehensive continuity of operations planning guidance. A better 
alternative will be to develop a separate guide that focuses on continuity of 
operations planning for higher education. 
 A working group should be formed by a lead federal agency for the revision 
of the current guideline or for the development of a new one. The members of 
the working group should represent a broad cross-section of institutions of 
higher education with involvement by the U.S. Department of Education, 
FEMA, and other applicable stakeholders. Such a working group came 
together in 2007 resulting from the impact of Hurricane Katrina on institutions 
of higher education in New Orleans (University of Maryland, 2007). The 
recommendations that came from the 2007 working group relevant to 
continuity of operations planning for higher education were comprehensive 
and covered all the salient considerations. 
 Pilot programs should be established with a focus on continuity of operations 
planning at institutions of higher education. In 2013, The U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security solicited participants for its Campus Resilience Pilot 
Program (Homeland Security News Wire, 2013). A total of seven institutions 
of higher education were chosen for the program with the intent of providing 
them with guidance on building disaster resiliency on their campuses utilizing 
FEMA’s “whole community” concept. The guidance that ensued was light on 
continuity of operations planning and heavy on preparedness, protection, 
prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery. I served as a peer reviewer for 
the grant applications.  
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 The U.S. Department of Education and FEMA should incorporate more 
continuity of operations planning in training sessions that are geared to higher 
education. The U.S. Department of Education currently offers basic 
emergency operations planning training sessions at no cost through its 
contractor REMS TA Center. However, the training is mainly focused on 
preparation and response with very little information provided on continuity 
of operations planning. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security through 
FEMA offers a cost free workshop for institutions of higher education to assist 
them in revising and further developing their emergency operations plans. 
However, as with the training offered by the U.S. Department of Education, 
very little continuity of operations planning guidance is provided. 
 The White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
(White House Initiative) should take a greater interest in continuity of 
operations planning at HBCUs. The White House Initiative sponsors a yearly 
conference in Washington, D.C. that will provide a national platform for 
pushing planning in this regards to conference attendees who are generally 
presidents, provosts, and vice presidents of HBCUs. 
 It would behoove all six regional accreditation agencies to establish a 
continuity of operations planning standard for accreditation and 
reaccreditation of institutions of higher education. Several of the regional 
accreditation agencies currently require that emergency operations plans be 
developed. 
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 The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime 
Statistics Act require institutions of higher education to have emergency 
operations plans, and hold at least one annual exercise to test the plan. 
Institutions of higher education should be strongly encouraged to include 
comprehensive continuity of operations concepts in their plans and to devise 
exercises that test the implementation of these concepts during a disaster. 
 The U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security should join together to promote FEMA’s continuity of operations 
planning training programs.  
Implications for Social Change 
My study has the potential for spurring federal agencies such as the U.S. 
Department of Education and FEMA to develop programs to increase continuity of 
operations planning at HBCUs through the White House Initiative on HBCUs.  
This study has broader implications for social change above and beyond 
application to HBCUs. If appropriate guidance is developed by these two federal 
agencies on continuity of operations planning applicable to all institutions of higher 
education, increased disaster resiliency will occur to insure sustainability of these 
institutions in our communities. 
Furthermore, institutions of higher education throughout the nation can benefit 
from this study which provides a step-by-step model for continuity of operations 
planning. Increasing the stability, sustainability, and viability of all our institutions of 
higher education will insure that individuals seeking a college education will be able to 
do so without interruptions caused by disasters. 
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Conclusion 
The plight of Historically Black Colleges and Universities has been well-
documented in this study. It is unknown as to whether their situations will improve over 
time. However, everything humanely possible must be done to increase the resiliency of 
these institutions. As outlined in this study, an increased emphasis on continuity of 
operations planning will augment their current propensity for resiliency which has 
contributed to their longevity. As we have seen with the study participants, even in the 
absence of comprehensive written continuity of operations plans, they have weathered 
disasters by resolving how to perform mission essential functions such as food service 
and instruction. Support for this initiative must come from the U.S. Department of 
Education and FEMA in concert.  
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Appendix A: Acronyms 
CAQDAS  Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
CINAHL  Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature 
COOP   Continuity of Operations Planning 
ERIC   Education Resources Information Center 
FEMA   Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FERPA  Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
HBCU   Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
HBCU-LEEA  Historically Black Colleges and Universities Law Enforcement  
  Executives and Administrators 
ICS   Incident Command System 
HIPAA  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
IHE   Institution of Higher Education 
MEF   Mission Essential Function 
NASA   National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NFPA   National Fire Protection Association 
NIMS   National Incident Management System 
PWI   Predominantly White Institution 
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Appendix B: Interview Questions 
Extent of Continuity of Operations Planning at Historically Black Colleges and Universities in 
the State of Alabama 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The following questions will be used to guide the semi-structured interviews of the participants: 
1. What is your understanding of continuity of operations planning in an academic 
environment? 
 
2. What has been your training and experience in continuity of operations planning? 
 
3. Where can continuity of operations planning documents and information be found? 
 
4. Who is the person(s) tasked with continuity of operations planning and how is planning 
accomplished? 
 
5. What will be the institution’s response to a pandemic that will require student isolation or 
quarantining? How will students be taught, fed, and cared for? 
 
6. What plans are in place to care for laboratory animals and continue research during and 
after a disaster? 
 
7. What requirements are in place for vendors such as food service providers to continue or 
quickly resume operations during and after a disaster? 
 
8. What responsibility do departments have for continuity of operations planning? 
 
9. What disruptions in the educational process have occurred within the past seven (7) 
years? 
 
10. How has your institution responded to a disruption in the education process in the past? 
 
11. What support does administration provide for continuity of operations planning? 
 
12. What can be done to strengthen continuity of operations planning at your institution in 
terms of training, financial resources, equipment, and overall institution support? 
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13. What support have you obtained from your local emergency management agency in your 
continuity of operations planning?  
